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Abstract 
In 2010 the Basel Committee finalised the global framework called Basel III, which will 
have a significant impact on the global banking sector. A large part of the framework focuses 
on capital adequacy, where the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio is essential. Through an 
analysis of four banks from the United Kingdom – HSBC, Barclays, Lloyds Banking Group 
and Standard Chartered – this thesis aim to examine how these banks have adjusted to the 
new CET1 requirements. 
In the EU the Basel III framework will be implemented through the capital requirements 
directive (CRD IV), and in 2012 our sample banks estimated their CET1 ratios assuming 
fully implemented CRD IV. We project the CET1 ratios for previous years and find that they 
have increased this ratio, especially from 2006. This thesis shows that adjustments have been 
made in both the numerator (CET1) and the denominator, risk weighted assets (RWA). 
CET1 has strengthened due to better quality and increased quantity of equity. However, the 
main driver behind the increase in the ratios has been a reduction of risk weighted assets. In 
general, the average riskiness of asset portfolios has been reduced through management 
actions on the balance sheet. 
We also find that the impact of Basel III on our sample banks is heterogeneous because of 
banks’ differences regarding business structures and international exposure. The banks will 
also face different CET1 requirements after the transitional period. We project the 2019 final 
CET1 ratio requirement for each bank, and they all face a shortfall given a reasonable set of 
assumptions. This implies that the banks’ management still have to increase their CET1 
ratios. 
 
 3 
Preface 
This thesis is the final part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business 
Administration, with a major/main profile in Financial Economics. The thesis is written at 
The Norwegian School of Economics, fall 2013. Through courses and the ongoing debate of 
Basel III we both gained a special interest for this new framework, which made this a natural 
topic for our thesis. 
Writing this thesis have been challenging due to the complexity of the Basel framework. 
Still, the work has been interesting and educative as we have gained detailed knowledge 
about a difficult subject that can be relevant in future job situations. Being two persons 
writing this thesis has been a major advantage, especially when it comes to the interpretation 
of the framework and it has also been essential for the range of our analysis.  
We wish to thank our supervisor Francisco Santos for his guiding and feedback during the 
process. In addition we want to thank those who have read and commented on our thesis.  
 
 
 
 
Bergen, 12 December 2013 
 
 
 
_______________________    _______________________ 
Tonje Arneberg-Bauer    Oda Bjerketvedt 
 
 4 
Contents 
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 7 
 THEME ..................................................................................................................................... 7 1.1
1.1.1 Research question ......................................................................................................... 7 
1.1.2 Delimitations ................................................................................................................. 8 
 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ............................................................................................................... 8 1.2
 STRUCTURE OF THESIS ............................................................................................................. 9 1.3
2. THEORY ................................................................................................................................... 10 
 BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (BIS) .................................................................. 10 2.1
 BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (BCBS) ....................................................... 10 2.2
 BASEL I .................................................................................................................................. 11 2.3
2.3.1 Pillar 1: The constituents of capital – divided into two tiers ...................................... 12 
2.3.2 Pillar 2: The structure of risk weights ........................................................................ 13 
2.3.3 Pillar 3: A target standard ratio ................................................................................. 14 
2.3.4 Pillar 4: Transitional and implementing arrangements .............................................. 14 
2.3.5 Criticism ...................................................................................................................... 14 
 BASEL II ................................................................................................................................. 15 2.4
2.4.1 Pillar 1: Minimum Capital Requirements ................................................................... 15 
2.4.2 Pillar 2: Supervisory Review Process ......................................................................... 19 
2.4.3 Pillar 3: Market Discipline ......................................................................................... 19 
2.4.4 Criticism ...................................................................................................................... 19 
 BASEL III ............................................................................................................................... 20 2.5
2.5.1 New Capital Requirements .......................................................................................... 21 
2.5.2 Changes in RWA from Basel II to Basel III ................................................................ 22 
2.5.3 Capital Buffers ............................................................................................................ 23 
2.5.4 Leverage Ratio ............................................................................................................ 27 
2.5.5 Two new liquidity standards: LCR and NSFR ............................................................ 27 
2.5.6 The Capital Requirement Directive (CRD IV) ............................................................ 29 
 THE UK BANKING SECTOR ..................................................................................................... 29 2.6
2.6.1 Regulators of the financial sector ............................................................................... 29 
2.6.2 Additional UK regulation............................................................................................ 30 
3. SAMPLE BANKS AND SELECTED YEARS ...................................................................... 31 
3.1.1 Sample banks .............................................................................................................. 31 
3.1.2 Selected years for analysis .......................................................................................... 33 
3.1.3 Sources of information ................................................................................................ 33 
4. CALCULATION OF COMMON EQUITY TIER 1 ............................................................. 34 
 METHOD ................................................................................................................................ 34 4.1
 FINDINGS ............................................................................................................................... 41 4.2
5. CALCULATION OF RISK WEIGHTED ASSETS .............................................................. 42 
 METHOD ................................................................................................................................ 42 5.1
 5 
5.1.1 The European Banking Authority (EBA) exercise ....................................................... 43 
 WEAKNESSES ......................................................................................................................... 46 5.2
6. CALCULATION OF RATIOS ............................................................................................... 47 
7. ANALYSIS OF EQUITY ......................................................................................................... 50 
8. ANALYSIS OF ASSETS ......................................................................................................... 53 
 BALANCE SHEET ASSETS ........................................................................................................ 54 8.1
 EXPOSURE TO GIIPS .............................................................................................................. 56 8.2
 MATURITY OF ASSETS ............................................................................................................ 57 8.3
 ASSETS BY BUSINESS .............................................................................................................. 58 8.4
 RWA BY BUSINESS ................................................................................................................ 60 8.5
9. HOW ARE THE BANKS SITUATED TODAY? .................................................................. 62 
 ESTIMATED REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................................. 62 9.1
 SHORTFALL CALCULATION .................................................................................................... 63 9.2
 HOW TO MEET THE END-POINT REQUIREMENT? ...................................................................... 64 9.3
 FINDINGS ............................................................................................................................... 66 9.4
 WEAKNESSES ......................................................................................................................... 66 9.5
10. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 67 
 MAIN FINDINGS ................................................................................................................. 67 10.1
 DELIMITATIONS ................................................................................................................ 68 10.2
 FURTHER RESEARCH ......................................................................................................... 68 10.3
11. APPENDIX ............................................................................................................................... 70 
 ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................... 70 11.1
 CALCULATION OF CET1 ................................................................................................... 71 11.2
 CALCULATION OF RWA.................................................................................................... 73 11.3
 MATURITY OF ASSETS ....................................................................................................... 76 11.4
 THE RISKINESS OF ASSETS ................................................................................................. 77 11.5
12. BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................... 78 
 
 
 
 6 
Table summary 
Table 1: Simplified list over risk weights from Basel I (BCBS, 1988) .................................. 13 
Table 2: Capital conservation buffer; Minimum capital conservation standards ................... 23 
Table 3: Countercyclical buffer: Minimum capital conservation standards .......................... 25 
Table 4: G-SIBs; Buckets (BCBS, 2013e) ............................................................................. 26 
Table 5: Summary of key information about our sample banks ............................................ 32 
Table 6: CET1 calculations for HSBC ................................................................................... 34 
Table 7: CET1 capital 2012 .................................................................................................... 41 
Table 8: Sample banks’ CET1 capital .................................................................................... 41 
Table 9: Calculation of Basel III RWA; HSBC ..................................................................... 42 
Table 10: Increase in RWA at a general level in 2012 presented by EBA (EBA, 2013) ....... 44 
Table 11: Percentage increase in RWA due to Basel III ........................................................ 44 
Table 12: Basel III RWA ........................................................................................................ 46 
Table 13: CET1 ratios ............................................................................................................ 47 
Table 14: CET1 to equity ....................................................................................................... 47 
Table 15: CET1 to total assets ................................................................................................ 48 
Table 16: RWA to total assets ................................................................................................ 48 
Table 17: Payout ratios ........................................................................................................... 51 
Table 18: Riskiness of assets for HSBC ................................................................................. 61 
Table 19: Shortfall to CET1 requirements for all banks ........................................................ 64 
Table 20: Necessary changes in CET1 and RWA to meet maximum CET1 ratio. ................ 64 
Table 21: CET1 ratio: Average growth necessary and average growth 2011 and 2012 ........ 65 
Figure summary 
Figure 1: Development of CET1, RWA and exposure. ......................................................... 49 
Figure 2: Composition of equity ............................................................................................ 50 
Figure 3: Movement of RWA compared to assets ................................................................. 53 
Figure 4: Composition of assets ............................................................................................. 54 
Figure 5: Net exposure to GIIPS as a fraction of total assets ................................................. 56 
Figure 6: The maturity of HSBC's assets ............................................................................... 57 
Figure 7: The maturity of LBG's assets .................................................................................. 58 
Figure 8: The composition of assets for each bank ................................................................ 59 
Figure 9: Required CET1 ratios ............................................................................................. 63 
Figure 10: CET1 ratios 2019 compared to maximum requirement. ....................................... 65 
 7 
1. Introduction 
 Theme 1.1
In the 1970’s financial markets saw the need for international banking supervision, and the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
1
 was established in 1974. The Basel 
Committee introduced the first Basel framework in 1988 called the Basel Capital Accord 
(Basel I). Since then financial markets have changed, becoming more interlinked and banks 
more securitised. As new challenges emerged due to increased complexity and risk factors, 
the regulation had to change as well which resulted in a new framework called Basel II. This 
framework was much more comprehensive, but as the financial crisis (2007-2009) revealed, 
the banking sector was not able to absorb losses, and problems in the financial sector had a 
large impact on the real economy. The Basel Committee then began to improve Basel II by 
focusing more on risk management and strengthening banks’ transparency and disclosures. 
In 2010 this resulted in a third framework; Basel III. This new framework seeks to redress 
the weaknesses of the earlier framework by increasing the attention to both capital and 
liquidity of banks. The requirements to quality and quantity of capital have been 
strengthened, especially for Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1). 
In this thesis we look at the UK banking sector which by assets is the second largest in the 
world, and UK banks have large international impact. In the EU, Basel III will be 
implemented through the capital requirements directive (CRD IV), but UK banks will face 
tougher regulations as national banking authorities will impose even stricter capital 
requirements. 
1.1.1 Research question 
It is now about three years since the Basel III framework was launched and the gradual 
phase-in of the new requirements have started. This means that banks have had time to adapt 
to the new regulations and hopefully strengthened their resilience. UK banks have reported 
CET1 ratios in 2012 under the assumption of fully implemented CRD IV rules. We would 
like to see how they have managed to reach these ratios despite the economic downturn. To 
do this we implement the new requirements for previous years and get an overview of how 
                                                          
1 Abbreviations are found in Appendix 11.1 
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the banks were situated and how they have adjusted. Our focus will be on changes in the 
numerator, CET1, and the denominator, RWA. By doing this we will seek to answer: 
 “How have banks adjusted to increase CET1 ratios?” 
1.1.2 Delimitations 
This thesis is limited to the calculation of capital requirements related to the CET1 ratio. The 
thesis will not cover other parts of the new framework; i.e. calculation of additional capital, 
liquidity requirements or leverage ratio. 
 Previous research 1.2
The Basel Committee conducts several studies on how the new framework will be 
implemented, how it will affect banks and how far banks have come in the implementation. 
The last progress report was published September 2013; “Progress report on implementation 
of the Basel regulatory framework” which examines whether capital standards are 
implemented into national law or regulation to the agreed timeframes (BCBS, 2013g). The 
Basel Committee has also conducted periodically monitoring studies where they review the 
implications of Basel III for financial markets, and the last results were reported 25 
September 2013 (BCBS, 2013b). These studies are called Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) 
(BCBS, 2013f). 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) conducted in 2011 an EU-wide stress test where all 
participating banks were stressed against a stronger capital benchmark of 5% Core Tier 1 
(EBA, 2011). They have also conducted studies on how banks will be affected of the Basel 
III rules through monitoring exercises, which has been performed semi-annually since June 
2011. The EBA monitoring exercises look at a large sample of banks and they only report 
the average changes (EBA, 2013). 
At NHH there are some master theses written on Basel III; Dirdal and Heiberg (2011) 
conducted a detailed analysis of DnB NOR under Basel III rules, Andreasen and Gulestø 
(2011) wrote about how Basel III would affect Norwegian banks, and how the banks would 
adjust to the new rules. However, none of these master theses analysed the CET1 ratio in 
details, nor did they look at adjustments made in the years prior to the introduction of Basel 
III, and they only analysed Norwegian banks. Since we will do a more detailed analysis of 
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the CET1 ratio and focus more on large international banks, our thesis will be a good 
supplement to previous theses.  
 Structure of thesis 1.3
In chapter 2 we present the theoretical framework, starting with an introduction of the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
and the different Basel frameworks. Further, a short introduction of the UK banking sector 
and its regulation is presented. Details about our sample banks and the selected years are 
found in chapter 3.  
The analysis is presented in chapter 4-9, starting with the calculation of Common Equity 
Tier 1 and Risk Weighted Assets in chapter 4 and chapter 5. In Chapter 6 are the 
calculations of the CET1 ratio. To analyse changes in the numerator, our sample banks’ 
equity are analysed in chapter 7, while chapter 8 address changes in the denominator, 
RWA. To get an overview of how the sample banks are situated today, the required CET1 
ratio and the corresponding shortfall is estimated in chapter 9.  
In the last part, chapter 10, main findings from the analysis is summarised into the 
conclusion to answer the research question; “How have banks adjusted to increase CET1 
ratios”.  
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2. Theory 
 Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 2.1
The Bank for International Settlements, BIS, has head office in Basel, Switzerland, and was 
established on 17 May 1930; making BIS the world’s oldest international financial 
organisation. Originally, BIS was established to deal with the issue of reparation payments 
imposed to Germany after the First World War (BIS, b). Today, BIS act as a bank for central 
banks by helping them pursuit monetary and financial stability and foster international 
cooperation in those areas. BIS does not provide financial services to private individuals or 
corporate entities; only central banks and international organisations. 
According to their webpage, BIS emphasises some key points on how to pursue their 
mission: 
 promoting discussion and facilitating collaboration among central banks;  
 supporting dialogue with other authorities that are responsible for promoting 
financial stability;  
 conducting research on policy issues confronting central banks and financial 
supervisory authorities;  
 acting as a prime counterparty for central banks in their financial transactions; and  
 serving as an agent or trustee in connection with international financial operations. 
 (BIS, a) 
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 2.2
The Basel Committee is a committee on banking regulations and supervisory practices 
located at the Bank for International Settlements. Turmoil in the international currency and 
banking market promoted a need for international banking supervision, and at the end of 
1974 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was established. It was the failure of 
Bankhaus Herstatt in Germany, and later also the Franklin National Bank in USA, which 
eventually led the central-bank Governors of the Group of Ten (G10) to meet in February 
1975. Since that day the list of members has increased and each country is represented by the 
central bank or by other formal authority for banking supervision.  
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The Basel Committee, today led by Mr Stefan Ingves, has a goal of enhancing financial 
stability through regulation and supervision of banks worldwide. This committee provides a 
forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters and is the primary global-standard 
setter for regulation of banks.  
The Basel committee formulate supervisory standards and guidelines for best practices, and 
a key objective has been to reduce differences in international supervisory coverage, making 
sure all international banks are supervised. This can remove competitive inequality due to 
differences in national capital requirements and make sure that the supervision is adequate. 
However, they do not have any authority or legal force over its members, but they expect 
country members to implement the standards in a way consistent with their national system.  
In the 1980s the committee emphasised topics on capital adequacy, and they were concerned 
that the capital ratios for many international banks were aggravated in a time with 
increasingly international risk. A consultative work between the Basel Committee and The 
Group of Ten Governors resulted in a capital measurement system, referred to as the Basel 
Capital Accord or Basel I, which was released to banks in July 1988. 
After several years of changes and improvement, based on consultative work with banks and 
industry groups the New Capital Framework, also referred to as Basel II, was released on 26 
June 2004. However, the financial crisis (2007-2009) revealed several weaknesses of the 
regulation and supervision of international banks, and the Basel Committee has since then 
been working towards strengthening the supervision and risk management of the banking 
sector, culminating in a new capital framework; Basel III (BCBS, 2013a). 
Below we will discuss the contents and structures of Basel I, II and III. 
 Basel I 2.3
The Basel I framework was meant for member states and other developed markets, it was not 
intended for emerging market economies. The main scope on risk was credit risk and the 
standard proposed was just a minimum capital requirement, central banks could be more 
conservative in their banking regulations (Balin, Bryan J., 2008). 
As mentioned above the main focus was credit risk which is the risk associated with the 
counterparty (borrower) being unable to meet the arranged agreement; failure to repay a loan 
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or another obligation (Norges Bank, 2013). To prevent banks to be severely affected by 
default from its customers the framework in Basel I required capital reserves to cover 
potential losses. Shortly, Basel I “required”;  
            
                    
    
The document “International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards” 
published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in July 1988 is the original text 
of the Basel Capital Accord. The document is divided into four pillars; the first two describe 
the constituents of capital, hence the numerator, and the structure of the risk weights – the 
denominator. Pillar three describes the target standard ratio and pillar four deals with 
transitional and implementing arrangements. 
The following description of the Basel Capital Accord is obtained from the original text from 
the Basel Committee:  
2.3.1 Pillar 1: The constituents of capital – divided into two tiers 
a) Core capital (basic equity) – tier 1 
Key element capital should be equity capital and disclosed reserves (retained 
earnings or other surplus). But for supervisory purposes 50% of the capital base can 
consist of other elements of capital, called tier 2.  
b) Supplementary capital – tier 2 
i. Undisclosed reserves 
ii. Revaluation reserves – especially relevant for banks whose balance sheets include 
amounts of equity held in historic cost. 
iii. General provisions/general loan-loss reserves 
iv. Hybrid debt capital instruments – instruments which combine characteristics of 
equity capital and of debt. 
v. Subordinated term debt – maximum of 50% of tier 1 elements. 
c) Deductions from capital  
i. From tier 1; Goodwill 
ii. From total capital: Investments in subsidiaries engaged in banking and financial 
activities which are not consolidated in national systems. 
(BCBS, 1988) 
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2.3.2 Pillar 2: The structure of risk weights 
In the denominator, risk weighted assets, capital are related to different categories of assets 
and are weighted according to broad categories of relative riskiness. The framework of 
weights has been kept simple, only five weights are used; 0, 10, 20, 50 and 100%. 
Simplified list over risk weights by category from the Basel Capital Accord:  
Risk weight Descriptions 
0%  Cash 
 Government debt and deposits in central banks 
 Other claims on OECD central governments and central banks. 
0, 10, 20 or 
50% 
 Committee agreed that the weights for domestic public-sector entities 
(PSEs) should be 0, 10, 20 or 50%, decided on national discretion, 
but that PSEs in foreign countries within the OECD should attract a 
standard 20% weight. 
20%  Claims on multilateral development banks and claims guaranteed by 
securities issued by such banks. 
 Claims on banks and loans guaranteed by banks incorporated in the 
OECD. 
 Claims on banks and loans guaranteed by banks incorporated outside 
the OECD with a residual maturity of up to one year. 
 Claims on and loans guaranteed by non-domestic OECD PSEs. 
 Cash items in process of collection. 
50%  Loans fully secured by mortgage on residual property that is or will 
be occupied by the borrower or that is rented. 
100%  Claims on the private sector and commercial companies owned by 
the public sector (to avoid competitive inequality). 
 Claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD with a residual 
maturity of over one year. 
 Claims on central governments outside the OECD, unless 
denominated in national currency. 
 Premises, plant and equipment and other fixed assets. 
 Real estate and other investments. 
 Capital instruments issued by other banks 
 All other assets 
Table 1: Simplified list over risk weights from Basel I (BCBS, 1988) 
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2.3.3 Pillar 3: A target standard ratio 
The target standard ratio of capital to weighted risk assets should be set at 8%. Since the 
supplementary capital can only pose 50% of the capital base the core capital element will be 
at least 4%.  
2.3.4 Pillar 4: Transitional and implementing arrangements 
1. Transition 
The transitional period was from July 1988 to the end of 1992.  
2. Implementation 
Each authority could decide in which way they would introduce and apply the 
recommendations, but the arrangements was to be implemented as soon as possible. 
 (BCBS, 1988) 
2.3.5 Criticism 
Even though Basel I was a step in the right direction there were also important failures. In 
Basel I the primarily focus, concerning risk, was credit risk, which is indeed the main risk 
incurred by banks. However, banks also face other types of risks which created a loophole 
concerning risk shifting. The capital requirements did not include market risk, and banks 
could shift their risk from priced credit risk to un-priced market risk, until the Market Risk 
Amendment of 1996 imposed a capital charge for market risk exposure (Alen, 2003). 
Banks also found ways to “work around” the system by taking on more risk without having 
to increase their capital requirements. One strategy, called “Cherry-picking”, was to splice 
their least risky bank loans and securitise them. Money gained from selling these securitised 
loans in the market could be added to the banks’ reserves, and they would then be able to 
give out more loans. Another method was to swap long-term debt holdings for short-run 
debt. Because short-run debt had a risk weight of 20% while the long-term debt carried a 
100% risk weight, banks could reduce their risk on paper, but in reality the risk was the 
same. 
Another source for criticism, warned against in the framework, was that emerging market 
economies adopted the framework because it was seen as a sign of regulation and financial 
stability. Due to the definition in the Framework that government debt and national currency 
was viewed as low risk, emerging market economies could reduce their risk by shifting bank 
and sovereign debt holdings from OECD sources to domestic sources. However, in many 
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emerging markets the government debt was risky and the currencies fluctuated, causing 
regulators to underestimate the risk in these markets (Balin, Bryan J., 2008). 
There was also criticism towards the risk weights used on borrowers. An enterprise with 
rating AAA has a much lower credit risk than companies with lower credit rating, but Basel I 
failed to differentiate between high quality and low quality commercial credit, which meant 
that loan to different companies with different credit ratings received the same risk weight 
under Basel I  (Aamo, 2002) (Alen, 2003). 
 Basel II 2.4
Introduction of a new framework stems from mentioned weaknesses in Basel I and in 
response to the banking crisis in the 1990s. In June 1999, the Basel Committee sent out a 
proposal called “A new capital adequacy framework”, which was a consultative paper. After 
years of consultative work between the Committee and its member states a revised 
framework was published in June 2004; Basel II (BCBS, 2004). 
Basel II expanded its technical scope, adapted to the fact that banks had become more 
securitised, took into account other risk factors such as market risk, operational risk and 
interest rate risk, and emphasised market discipline by focusing more on surveillance and 
regulation (Balin, Bryan J., 2008). 
One of the major changes was that the framework would include any holding company 
within a banking group to make sure banks could not transfer risk. The entire risk of the 
banking group would now be captured. It would also apply to all international active banks 
within a banking group.  
The framework was divided into three pillars; Minimum capital requirements, Supervisory 
review and Market discipline.  
2.4.1 Pillar 1: Minimum Capital Requirements 
As in Basel I the capital ratio was calculated by using the definition of regulatory capital 
and risk weighted assets. The ratio had to be more than 8%, and tier 2 was limited to 100% 
of tier 1, which meant that tier 1 had to be at least 4%. Few changes were made regarding 
the constituents of capital, but for the calculation of risk weighted assets there were several 
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changes. Before, only credit risk was accounted for while in Basel II both market risk and 
operational risk was included. To summarise the changes: 
 
           
                    
           
      
           
                    
                                        
     
 (BCBS, 2004) 
Credit risk 
The Committee would then allow banks to choose between two broad methodologies for 
calculating their capital requirements for credit risk; a standardised approach and the banks 
internal rating systems for credit risk (IRB) (BCBS, 2004). 
Standardised Approach 
The Standardised Approached is supported by external credit assessments, which means that 
claims are assigned a risk weight in accordance with the credit rating by an authorised credit 
institution, i.e. Standard & Poor’s credit rating. A large part of the Revised Framework sets 
out revisions regarding risk weighting. The examples below are obtained from the Revised 
Framework from June 2004, and are just some of the risk weights detailed in Basel II. 
Claims on sovereigns and their central banks: 
Credit 
Assessment 
AAA to 
AA- 
A+ to A- BBB+ to 
BBB- 
BB+ to B- Below B- Unrated 
Risk Weight 0% 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
Claims on Corporates: 
Credit 
Assessment 
AAA 
to AA- 
A+ to A- BBB + to BB- Below BB- Unrated 
Risk Weight 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
For claims on banks national supervisors can choose between two risk weighting options, 
but they can only apply one option to all banks in their jurisdiction. In the first option banks 
are assigned a risk weight one step below that assigned to claims on the sovereign 
government in that country. But if the sovereigns’ rating is below BB+ or is unrated, risk 
will be capped at 100%. The second option uses the external credit assessment of the bank 
itself. 
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Claims on Banks: 
Option 1 
Credit Assessment of 
Sovereign 
AAA to 
AA- 
A+ to 
A- 
BBB+ to 
BBB- 
BB+ to 
B- 
Below 
B- 
Unrated 
Risk Weight under Option 1 20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100% 
 
Option 2 
Credit Assessment of 
Banks 
AAA to 
AA- 
A+ to 
A- 
BBB+ to 
BBB- 
BB+ to 
B- 
Below 
B- 
Unrated 
Risk Weight under option 2 20% 50% 50% 100% 150% 50% 
Risk Weight for short-term 
claims under option 2 
20% 20% 20% 50% 150% 20% 
 (BCBS, 2004) 
Internal Ratings-Based Approaches (IRB) 
There are two different approaches of IRB; Foundation IRB and Advanced IRB. The two 
methods are not very different and Basel II encourages banks to use either IRB method 
instead of the Standardised approach. Banks that have received supervisory approval can use 
the Advanced IRB which means they can develop their own model for estimating risk 
components in determining the capital requirement. However, not all banks can use the 
Advanced IRB; some are required to use provided assumptions (from regulators) on one or 
more of the risk components; the probability of default, loss given default, the exposure at 
default and effective maturity (Balin, Bryan J., 2008) (BCBS, 2004).  
Operational Risk 
Operational risk is defined as the probability of losses caused by operational failures such as 
defects in internal controls or IT-systems or mistakes made by people in the organisation 
(Norges Bank, 2013). 
Basel II presents three methods for calculating the reserves needed to be secured against 
operational risk; The Basic Indicator Approach, the Standardised Approach and Advanced 
Measurement Approaches (AMA). International active banks, banks with significant 
exposure to operational risk and sophisticated banks are expected to use the more advanced 
methods which are more appropriate to those banks’ risk profiles.  
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When using the Basic Indicator Approach banks must hold capital for operational risk equal 
to 15% of their average gross income over the last three years. In the Standardised 
Approach banks’ activities are divided into different business lines, and within each 
business line gross income is a good indicator of the exposure to operational risk. The 
capital against operational risk is calculated for each business line by multiplying gross 
income by a specific factor for that business line. The third, and most advanced method 
(AMA), encourages banks to develop their own calculations for the capital requirement. Use 
of AMA requires regulators’ approval of the results, and the method is an attempt to urge 
market discipline and self-surveillance into the banking sector (Balin, Bryan J., 2008) 
(BCBS, 2004).  
Market Risk 
Market risk is risk related to movements in asset prices such as stocks or interests. (Norges 
Bank). In Basel II they have kept the basic structure of the 1996 Market Risk Amendment 
regarding the treatment of market risk, but in Basel II this is referred to as trading book 
issues; “A trading book consists of positions in financial instruments and commodities held 
either with trading intent or in order to hedge other elements of the trading book” (BCBS, 
2004). 
There are two main components of market risk; interest risk and volatility risk, and 
according to Balin (2008) Basel II makes a distinction between fixed income and other 
products such as equity, commodities and foreign exchange vehicles.  
For calculation of the risk related to fixed income assets Basel II recommends Value at Risk 
(VaR), where banks themselves develop their own calculation, which then have to be 
approved by regulators. However, some banks do not want to or cannot use VaR models. 
These banks can then use an alternative method which separates between the two risk 
factors. For interest rate risk the assets are weighted in accordance with their maturity, 
where long term maturity receives a higher risk weight. The volatility risk assets are 
weighted in accordance with external credit risk rating. For the calculation of the total 
amount of reserves needed to protect against market risk, the value of each fixed income 
asset is multiplied against both risk weightings and then summarised. 
Basel II presents different methodologies for all other market-based assets, but since they 
are very comprehensive we will not discuss them in detail. Primarily there are three main 
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methodologies; The Simplified Approach, Scenario Analysis and Internal Model Approach 
(IMA) (Balin, Bryan J., 2008). 
2.4.2 Pillar 2: Supervisory Review Process 
This process is intended to ensure that banks have adequate capital and that they develop 
and use better risk management techniques. To ensure all of the above, regulators are given 
more power to review a bank and intervene when felt necessary. There are four key 
principles of supervisory review identified by the committee in the Reviewed Framework: 
1. Banks should have a process for assessing their overall capital adequacy in relation 
to their risk profile and strategy for maintaining their capital levels. 
2. Supervisors should review and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy 
assessments and strategies, as well as their ability to monitor and ensure their 
compliance with regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors should take appropriate 
supervisory action if they are not satisfied with the result of this process. 
3. Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory capital 
ratios and should have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the 
minimum. 
4. Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from falling 
below the minimum levels required to support the risk characteristics of a particular 
bank and should require rapid remedial action if capital is not maintained or 
restored. 
 (BCBS, 2004) 
2.4.3 Pillar 3: Market Discipline 
The purpose of Pillar 3 is to complement Pillar 1 and 2, and the Committee aims to 
encourage market discipline by developing several disclosure requirements. In that way there 
is more transparency, and shareholders can have more power to enforce discipline in risk-
taking and reserve-holdings. 
2.4.4 Criticism  
The financial crisis (2007-2009) revealed several weaknesses of Basel II of the banking 
sector; the banking sector was not able to absorb losses, and problems in the financial sector 
had a large impact on the real economy. Some of the main areas of criticism towards Basel II 
relates to implementation in emerging markets and procyclicality. 
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Procyclicality 
In Basel II, banks could use credit ratings based on internal models, which some critics have 
characterised as short-time models, hence the internal based ratings were in alliance with the 
economic cycle. In an economic upturn the credit ratings would be higher than in a 
recession, which would give the banks lower capital requirements, and therefore opportunity 
to increase their lending. When a downturn hits the economy the credit ratings go down and 
banks need more capital which will reduce their lending, hence acting procyclical. Another 
source for procyclicality is due to the fact that an economic upturn leads to increased income 
and reduced default rates, giving banks opportunity to increase lending further (Øverli, 
2002).  
Emerging markets 
As in Basel I, the committee stated that Basel II was not tailored for emerging market 
economies. But large international banks and credit rating agencies all viewed the Basel 
framework as a sign of financial and regulatory stability, forcing banks in emerging market 
to adopt the recommendations. One of the problems was related to the high technicality in 
Basel II, and the lack of skilled workers in these countries. Basel II also relied upon rating 
agencies to value risk but not all banks in emerging countries could afford to have their debt 
rated by known credit agencies, and there was also a lack of knowledge of emerging 
economies in these agencies, causing unfavourable ratings (Balin, Bryan J., 2008).  
 Basel III 2.5
With Basel III, the Committee wants to improve risk management and strengthen banks’ 
transparency and disclosures. They want to raise the quality, consistency and transparency of 
the capital base, reduce procyclicality by promoting countercyclical buffers and address 
systemic risk (BCBS, 2011b). Basel III focuses more on systemic risk rather than the 
individual risk of each bank. The financial crisis taught us that even though banks might 
look solid, it means nothing when there are large macroeconomic imbalances (Gullbrandsen, 
2010). 
In 2009 The Basel Committee introduced two consultative proposals to create a more 
resilient financial sector. The first document called “Strengthening the Resilience of the 
Banking Sector” covers the proposals regarding the improvement and expansion of the 
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capital adequacy framework. The other document “International Framework for liquidity 
risk measurement, standards and monitoring”, introduces two liquidity standards. 
In the following we will explain the new capital requirements where the Basel Committee 
presents different buffers and a leverage ratio, before discussing the new global liquidity 
standard. 
2.5.1 New Capital Requirements 
Basel III includes, as Basel II, specific minimums level for the different types of capital 
included in the total capital. As with Basel II the requirement is still 8% of the risk weighted 
assets (RWA) for the total capital, but the constituents of capital are stricter and lead towards 
a larger amount of high-quality capital.  
Tier 1 capital 
Tier 1 capital is capital that relates to the on-going operations and consists of common equity 
tier 1 (CET1) and additional tier 1. CET1 consists of the highest quality of capital and 
includes Accumulated Equity Issue Proceeds and Accumulated Retained Earnings (BCBS, 
2011). The Additional Tier 1 includes hybrid capital, which is considered to be the second 
highest-quality capital. As to the increased focus on higher-quality capital the Basel III-
framework demands that the CET1 and Tier 1 capital should represent respectively 4.5% and 
6.0% of the RWA. Compared to the former requirements of 2.0% and 4.0% this represents a 
clear shift from Basel II towards higher quality capital (BCBS, 2011b). 
Tier 2 capital  
Tier 2 capital consists of gone concern capital, and includes among others subordinated debt. 
Tier 2 is capital that secures the depositors and senior creditors from losses if a bank or 
institution fail (European Commision, 2013). Tier 2 capital is prioritised before Tier 1 
capital, which means that it takes losses after Tier 1.  
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Overview over the requirements for the total capital adequacy:  
 
                       
    
   
      
 
                        
                      
   
      
 
                       
             
   
      
 
(BCBS, 2011b) 
2.5.2 Changes in RWA from Basel II to Basel III 
Counterparty Credit Risk 
Counterparty credit risk (CCR) has received increased attention in Basel III, and the 
management and capitalisation of this type of risk has been strengthened to make sure that 
all material risk is included in the framework (BCBS, 2011). If a counterparty experiences a 
deterioration of their credit rating there will be an additional capital charge, or if there is 
exposure to large financial institutions the risk weight will increase. This also imposes an 
increased capital requirement for Over-The-Counter derivatives exposure and thereby giving 
incentives for clearing these instruments through central counterparties (Accenture, 2012).  
Securitisation Positions 
There is a change related to the treatment of securitisation positions that under Basel II was 
deducted 50% from Core Tier 1 and 50% from Tier 1. Under Basel III these exposures have 
to be risk weighted with 1250% (multiplied with 12,5) (EBA, 2013).  
Threshold Rule 
Basel III includes a change in the treatment of unconsolidated investment and deferred tax 
asset that affects both CET1 and RWA, noted the threshold effect. The new requirement 
states that deferred tax assets and unconsolidated significant investments in other financial 
institutions that in aggregate exceed the institutions CET1 shall be deducted. The amount 
below the threshold is assigned a risk weight of 250% (European Commision, 2013). 
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2.5.3 Capital Buffers 
In addition to the level of 8% capital adequacy, Pillar 1 is extended with two capital buffers 
that increase the requirement for Common Equity Tier 1 capital above the 4.5% minimum 
level. The common purpose of the buffers is to increase the ability of the banking system to 
absorb losses and to reduce the impact of financial and economic shocks (Finanstilsynet, 
2013). When banks do not have an adequate level of CET1 to cover the minimum level of 
the capital requirements and buffers, there will be limitations on capital distributions.  
Capital conservation buffer  
The capital conservation buffer aims to cover losses and secure that the capital does not fall 
below the requirements when the economy is facing a downturn. The conservation buffer is 
a permanent buffer that can be drawn down when facing periods of stress. In this way the 
buffer is supposed to strengthen the banking sectors resilience when facing a downturn. This 
buffer is set to be 2.5% CET1 of risk weighted assets, in addition to the Total Capital 
requirements of 4.5% CET1.  
As mentioned, if a capital buffer is depleted, limitation on capital distribution will be 
imposed. This is to ensure rebuilding of capital and to make sure that banks do not set 
shareholders interest above depositors. As illustrated in the table below the minimum level 
of capital conservation decreases with the level of CET1 (BCBS, 2011b).  
Individual bank minimum capital conservation standards 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio Minim Capital Conservation Ratios (expressed as 
a percentage of earnings) 
4.5%-5.125% 100% 
>5.125%-5.75% 80% 
>5.75%-6.375% 60% 
>6.375%-7.0% 40% 
>7.0% 0% 
Table 2: Capital conservation buffer; Minimum capital conservation standards (BCBS, 
2011b) 
This implies that if a bank faces a total of 6.0% CET1 they cannot pay out more than 40% of 
the earnings. The restricted distribution of capital includes dividends, share buybacks, 
discretionary bonus payments and discretionary payments on other Tier 1 capital 
instruments.  
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Summarised this implies a total requirement for CET1 of 7.0% and Tier 1 capital of 8.5%. 
The Basel Committee has proposed a gradually phase-in of the conservation buffer, starting 
at a level of 0.625% January 2016 and reaching the final level of 2.5% January 2019 (BCBS, 
2011b). 
The countercyclical buffer (CCB)  
In addition to the capital conservation buffer, a countercyclical buffer is launched with Basel 
III.  The purpose of the CCB is to reduce pro-cyclicality within the banking sector and avoid 
critical and large losses after periods of strong credit growth and thereby protecting the 
banking sector and the real economy, making the banking sector work as a shock-absorber 
instead of a transmitter of risk (BCBS, 2011b). 
 As opposed to the conservation buffer, the countercyclical buffer will vary relative to the 
economic situation; high in “good times” and zero in “bad times”. The CCB is country-
specific and the National authorities are responsible for setting the rate between 0% and 
2.5% of RWA, reflecting the situation in the different jurisdictions. The buffer shall consist 
of common equity or other fully loss absorbing capital. Together with the conservation 
buffer the total requirement for Tier 1 and CET1 capital can increase up to 11% and 9.5% 
during economic “booms”. 
The countercyclical buffer is supposed to apply when the systemic risk in the economy 
increases, which can be measured by high asset prices and especially high increase in credit 
growth. The national authorities are responsible for setting the different indicators to 
measure the systemic risk. The buffer will apply to all banks operating in the specific 
country – both domestic and foreign. Banks who operates internationally will have to weigh 
the average of the different national buffers, reflecting their global portfolio of credit 
exposure across these jurisdictions (BCBS, 2011b).  
When target level of the CCB is depleted, similar limitations on capital distributions as to the 
conservation buffer becomes binding. As expressed by the Bank of International Settlement 
the minimum capital conservation ratio decreases with the CET1 ratio. 
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Individual bank minimum capital conservation standards, when a 
bank is subject to a 2.5% countercyclical requirement 
 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio 
(including other fully loss absorbing 
capital) 
Minimum Capital Conservation Ratios 
(expressed as a percentage of earnings) 
4.5% - 5.75% 100% 
>5.75% - 7.0% 80% 
>7.0% - 8.25% 60% 
>8.25% - 9.5% 40% 
> 9.5% 0% 
Table 3: Countercyclical buffer: Minimum capital conservation standards (BCBS, 2011b) 
Extension of the conservation buffer: Systemic risk and systemically important 
banks 
The Basel III-framework also addresses the need for systemically important banks to have a 
higher loss absorbing capital than the minimum level presented by the capital requirements 
and the two already discussed buffers. The interconnectedness between these banks can 
increase the imbalances in the financial system when a crisis hits the economy, hence a 
tighter regulation is justified (BCBS, 2011b). In addition, several banks that were considered 
to be “too big to fail” received governmental help during the financial crisis (2007-2009), 
which might lead to expectations of similar help in the future. There is a risk of this leading 
towards a moral hazard problem creating incentives for excessive risk taking and growth 
through cheap financing, which makes it even more important with stricter regulation of 
these banks (Borchgrevink, 2011). This additional capital requirement will be mandatory for 
international banks that are considered to have a fundamental impact on the global financial 
system. National authorities are encouraged to implement similar requirements for domestic 
systemically important banks (BCBS, 2012). The requirement is an expansion of the 
conservation buffer and has to consist of CET1, and will thereby increase the total 
requirement for systemically important banks.  
Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) 
The Bank for International settlement finalised their design of this extension of the 
conservation buffer in July 2013 for Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs). To 
measure how global systemically important a bank is, several indicators are used: “size of 
banks, their interconnectedness, the lack of readily available substitutes or financial 
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institution infrastructure for the services they provide, their global (cross-jurisdictional) 
activity and their complexity” (BCBS, 2013e). By these measurements banks are placed in 
different “buckets” indicating their minimum level of additional loss absorbing capital (1.0% 
- 3.5% CET1). No banks are currently in Bucket 5, but the Bank for International Settlement 
points out the importance of always having an “empty bucket” as an incentive for banks to 
not increase their systemic importance. If this bucket becomes populated, a Bucket 6 with a 
higher requirement will be effective. 
Bucket Score Range* Higher loss absorbency requirement (common equity as 
a percentage of risk weighted assets 
5 D-E 3.5% 
4 C-D 2.5% 
3 B-C 2.0% 
2 A-B 1.5% 
1 Cutoff point - A 1.0% 
* All score ranges are equal in size. Scores equal to one of the boundaries are assigned to the higher bucket. 
Table 4: G-SIBs; Buckets (BCBS, 2013e) 
Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs) 
The buffer for systemically important banks can also be applied for banks that are not 
considered to be G-SIBs. The Basel framework addresses the importance of a stricter 
regulation of such banks, also at domestic level. National financial regulators have the 
authority of deciding the classification of a systemically important bank. EU have in their 
capital requirement directive (CRD IV) presented a CET1 requirement for other systemically 
important institutions to be 1% within July 2015 and 2% within July 2016, which is optional 
for Member States to implement (European Commision, 2013). 
Systemic Risk Buffer  
The EU also launches the possibility for Member States to implement a systemic risk buffer 
for the financial sector or specific parts of it. According to the European Commission the 
buffer is intended to prevent “long-term non-cyclical systemic or macro prudential risk” 
that can cause major problems to a Member State’s real economy and financial system. This 
buffer must consist of CET1 and can be set at national discretion up to 3% from 1 Jan 2014. 
From Jan 2015 a possible increase to 3%-5% is possible, after a notification to the 
Commission. If a level above 5% is desired in a Member State, authorisation from the 
commission is mandatory (European Commision, 2013). 
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2.5.4 Leverage Ratio 
In addition to the risk-based capital requirements, Basel III introduces a leverage ratio as an 
off-balance safeguard. The objective is to prevent a build-up of leverage which was one of 
the underlying reasons for the 2007-2009 financial crises. The Basel Committee points out 
that during the financial crisis many banks built up large amount of leverage while still 
having significant risk based capital ratios. The leverage ratio will therefore represent a 
simple and transparent measure of risk to protect against errors in measurement and model 
risk (BCBS, 2011b).  
The calculation of the leverage ratio is undertaking a testing period (2013-2017) and will be 
migrated into Pillar 1 on 1 January 2018, after the disclosure starts Jan 2015. In this period a 
minimum leverage ratio of 3% is to be tested (BCBS, 2013d).  
                
      
              
       
The total exposure is to be measured as the monthly average leverage ratio over the quarter. 
In general the exposure follows the accounting principles. For the off-balance items a 10% 
credit risk adjustment applies for undrawn credit facilities and 100% for the other off-
balance-sheet items (BCBS, 2011b).  
2.5.5 Two new liquidity standards: LCR and NSFR 
Basel III introduces two new liquidity standards to increase the resilience of the banking 
sector. During the financial crisis several banks had problems dealing with their liquidity 
management, even though they had adequate capital levels. Both of these standards consist 
of internationally harmonised parameters, but some of the parameters open for national-
adjustments to reflect different jurisdiction-specific conditions (BCBS, 2013c). 
Liquidy Coverage Ratio (LCR) 
The LCR was developed to ensure resilience of banks short-term liquidity management. The 
main target of this standard is to enquire banks to have an adequate stock of unencumbered 
high quality liquid assets (HQLA) to cover its liquidity needs for a 30-days period of 
liquidity stress. HQLA consists of cash, or assets that easily can be converted into cash 
without any loss (or little loss) of value in private markets during times of stress. HQLA are 
divided into Level 1 and Level 2 assets. Level 1 consists of the highest quality and liquidity, 
and includes “cash, central bank reserves, and certain marketable securities backed by 
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sovereigns and central banks” (BCBS, 2013c). Level 2 assets are divided into Level 2A and 
Level 2B, where Level 2A can consist of “covered bonds, certain government securities and 
corporate debt securities” and Level 2B includes “lower rated corporate bonds, residential 
mortgage backed securities and equities that meets certain conditions” (BCBS, 2013c). 
The amount of the different levels of assets is regulated by the framework and requires a 
maximum of 40% Level 2 assets, whit a 15% haircut of Level 2B assets. This implies that 
HQLA a have to consist of minimum 60% Level 1 asset.  
     
     
                                        
       
The stock of HQLA has to cover the total net cash flow over a 30 day-stress scenario. The 
total net cash flow then equals the expected cash outflow less the expected cash inflow, whit 
a restriction that aggregated cash inflow can’t be greater than 75% of the aggregated cash 
outflow. This ensures a minimum level of HQLA at all times.   
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) 
The NSFR aims to ensure that financial institutions have an acceptable level of more stable 
assets to cover their liquidity over medium and long term periods (1 year). The aim of this 
ratio is to “ensure a sustainable maturity structure of assets and liabilities”, and thereby 
reducing the “over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding during times of buoyant market 
liquidity” (BCBS, 2011b). 
              
                       
       
Stable funding is the total of a bank’s equity, stable deposits with over a one-year horizon, 
debt with at least a one year horizon and deposit from customers which is expected to remain 
in the institution during a stress scenario. Each of these items is weighted with a specific 
stable financing factor, according to how stable they are (the higher weight, the more stable) 
(Lie, Solli, & Christensen, 2012).  The required stable funding (denominator) is the sum of 
the different assets and off-balance items each weighted for a specific stable financing factor. 
The higher the weight, the less liquid is the asset. The process of finalising this ratio is still 
ongoing. An observation period is to be carried out to address if there are any unintended 
consequences with the implementation. The NSFR is planned to be finalised and become a 
minimum standard by 1 January 2018 (BCBS, 2013c). 
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2.5.6 The Capital Requirement Directive (CRD IV) 
The implementing of Basel III into European law is through the Capital Requirements 
Directive, “CRD IV”. This directive contains two legal instruments; a directive and a 
regulation (CRR). The CRR has immediate effect on the member states and covers the 
capital, liquidity, leverage and the counterpart credit risk and works as a single rule book. 
The directive has to be implemented into national law in the Member States, and includes the 
capital buffers, corporate governance, sanctions and prudential supervision (European 
Commision, 2013) 
 The UK banking sector  2.6
The UK banking sector is of great importance for the UK economy as it contributed with 
7.9% of the UK GDP and employed more than one million people in 2012. The total bank 
assets counted for over 460% of the UK GDP in 2011 which makes it the second largest 
banking sector in the world  (EBF, 2012) (TheCityUK, 2012). 
2.6.1 Regulators of the financial sector 
The Bank of England is the central bank in the UK and responsible for the “key post-trade 
financial market infrastructures, including securities settlement systems, central 
counterparties, and recognised payment systems” (Bank of England, 2013b). The Financial 
Policy Committee (FPC) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) was established in 
April 2013 after a split of the former Financial Services Authority. The FPC is an 
independent organisation and is objected to take part in the achievement of the Bank of 
England’s objective of financial stability through reducing or removing systemic risks (Bank 
of England, 2013b).  
The PRA is a direct part of the Bank of England, and among other it is responsible for the 
regulation and supervision of the UK banks. Its objective is to ensure stability in the UK 
financial system, which includes making sure that banks have adequate capital and liquidity. 
The PRA sets out the regulations and undertake supervision of the risk of the firms and if 
necessary require actions to reduce them (Bank of England, 2013a). The supervision and 
regulation is built upon three characteristics:  
 Judgement-based approach: The PRA will give judgement on to what extent firms 
are safe and meet their requirements as of today.   
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 Forward-looking approach: Firms will also be assessed against future risk that can 
arise. The PRA can intervene at an early stage if considered necessary.  
 Focused approach: The PRA will have a main focus on the firms that contains the 
greatest risk to the stability. 
 (Bank of England, 2013a) 
2.6.2 Additional UK regulation 
UK banks will have to follow CRD IV but in addition there will be some national 
adjustments, and there is still uncertainty regarding the total requirement of the capital 
buffers since not all of them are finalised by the UK Regulators.  
The national adjustments relate to the so called Pillar 2 requirements which may increase the 
total level of CET1 our sample banks need to hold. These additional requirements will be 
based on the banks individual strength. In the UK, these Pillar 2 capital requirements are 
divided into Pillar 2A and Pillar 2B. Pillar 2A is capital that must be hold if the banks risk is 
not fully covered by other regulation. Today this requirement can be met by any capital, but 
after a consulting period the PRA requires 56% to be CET1 from January 1 2015. This will 
further increase the total required level of CET1 above the one required in the CRD IV 
legislation (PRA, 2013).  
The Pillar 2B is capital that should cover the risks that a firm can face over a forward-
looking horizon provided to individual stress-testing and is often called the PRA Buffer. 
This buffer is firm-specific and will be added to the other requirements when these do not 
cover the capital adequacy under stress sufficiently, and is therefore a net amount. The 
current proposal is that the PRA-buffer has to consist of CET1 capital and may therefore 
increase the total amount of CET1 the sample banks need to hold (PRA, 2013). 
If the PRA buffer is not met by the bank, it can expect enhanced supervisory action and will 
have to prepare a “capital restoration plan”, but contrary to the CRD IV buffers no limitation 
of capital distribution will be imposed (PRA, 2013). 
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3. Sample banks and selected years 
The purpose of this thesis is to take a closer look at the European banking sector in line with 
the new Basel III. The criteria used when choosing the sample banks were as follows:  
 European banks from the same country which faces similar regulations and 
reporting-requirements.  
 Large international banks; The Basel framework is primarily designed for such 
banks. 
 Different banks in terms of business segments and degree of internationalisation to 
cover different impacts of Basel III.  
 Sufficient information available.  
 
After looking at several European banks and their reporting, the UK was chosen.  Their 
reporting was overall at a more detailed level regarding the capital adequacy, which was an 
important criterion to get sufficient details to perform the necessary calculations. 
We choose to look at a smaller sample and perform a detailed analysis on a fewer banks 
rather than a general analysis on many banks. The sample consists of some of the UK’s 
biggest banks; HSBC, Barclays, Lloyds Banking Group and Standard Chartered. The size of 
our sample is limited to four banks mainly due to time restrictions. All banks are among the 
world’s fifty biggest banks and have international presence, but still with differences 
regarding business segments and the degree of international presence. We choose four of the 
five biggest UK banks, where the third, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) is excluded. This is 
because RBS, as HSBC and Barclays, is among the 15 largest banks in the world, and we 
wanted to include some smaller banks (on a world basis). Hence, both Lloyds Banking 
Group (LBG) and Standard Chartered are included in our sample. 
In the next chapter we briefly introduce the banks in our sample. 
3.1.1 Sample banks 
HSBC  
HSBC is the largest bank in the UK and the second largest bank in the world (Global 
Finance, 2013). The bank was established in 1864 and is one of the largest international 
banks with operations in 87 countries. HSBC is structured in four business lines; 
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Commercial Banking, Global Banking and Markets, Private Banking and Retail Banking and 
Wealth Management (HSBC, 2013a). HSBC is the largest bank in our sample with a total 
asset value of US $m 2,692,538 as of 31.12.1.  
Barclays  
Barclays had assets value of US $m 2,351,777 31.12.12, and thereby follows HSBC as the 
second largest bank in the UK and is the eighth largest bank in the world (Global Finance, 
2013). They operate in over 50 countries where they provide services in personal banking, 
credit cards, corporate and investment banking and wealth and investments (Barclays, 2013). 
In our sample Barclays is the bank with the largest share within Investment Banking, which 
counts for around 70 per cent of total assets.  
Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) 
Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) is the fourth largest bank in the UK and the 22
nd 
largest bank 
in the world with assets of US $m 1,458,974 as of 31.12.12 (Global Finance, 2013). The 
Group consists of Lloyds Bank, Bank of Scotland, Halifax and TSB which together have 
more than 30 million customers in the UK. LBG primarily operates in the UK with a focus 
on retail and commercial banking. LBG is the bank with the largest share of retail banking in 
our sample (LBG, 2013). 
Standard Chartered 
Standard Chartered is the smallest bank in the sample with a total asset value of US $m 
636,518 by 31.12.2012. They are the fifth largest bank in the UK and the 45
th 
largest bank in 
the world (Global Finance, 2013). In our sample Standard Chartered has the lowest presence 
in the UK as they are primarily focused on Asia, Africa and the Middle East where 90 per 
cent of their income stems from. They aim to be the world’s best international bank, and 
operate across 68 markets with a focus on basic banking, divided into Wholesale and 
Commercial Banking (Standard Chartered, 2013). 
2012 Asset value (US $m) World ranking 
HSBC 2,692,538 2 
Barclays 2,351,777 8 
LBG 1,458,974 22 
Standard Chartered 636,518 45 
Table 5: Summary of key information about our sample banks 
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3.1.2 Selected years for analysis 
This thesis aims to analyse the changes done by banks due to Basel III. The new regulation 
was launched in 2010 which make the period 2009 to 2012 a natural focus for the analysis, 
as these years will give an overview of how the sample banks were situated prior to the 
announcement of Basel III and how they have adapted in the following years. The half-year 
statement for 2013 is also included as the latest update on their capital adequacy.  
The main reason for the new regulation was the lack of resilience in the banking sector. 
Hence, we want to supplement the analysis with earlier years to see how the banks would 
have been situated if Basel III was the applicable regulation at that time. 2000 is chosen as 
the earliest year and in addition 2006 is included to look closer at the situation prior to the 
Financial Crisis (2007-2009).  
For Standard Chartered the earliest available annual report is the one of 2001, and is 
therefore the year used in the analysis as the earliest estimated year.  Lloyds Banking Group 
was formed on 19 January 2009, when Lloyds TSB Group acquired HBOS. This restricts the 
information availability for some of our comparisons
2
.  
3.1.3 Sources of information 
We use data based on public secondary data collected from financial reports published by 
our sample banks. This is relied upon as a legitimate source of information. All of our 
sample banks are public listed companies and required to publish annual reports of their 
financial situation. From 2008, banks have been required to give additional statements 
regarding their capital adequacy, called Pillar 3 disclosures. All these reports and documents 
are collected from the companies’ webpages.   
 
                                                          
2 The data from 2000 and 2006 are based on annual reports from Lloyds TBS Group. 
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4. Calculation of Common Equity Tier 1 
As stated in previous sections, CET1 capital is essential in the new framework, and will 
replace the Core Tier 1 from Basel II. Low CET1 ratios will lead to stricter dividend policy 
and regulators might initiate other actions against banks that do not have adequate ratios. 
Because of the importance related to CET1 our calculations are very thorough and detailed.  
 Method 4.1
For 2012 and 2013 banks have in their Pillar 3 reports estimated CET1 and CET1 ratios 
assuming fully implemented CRD IV rules (as applicable from 2019). The calculations 
under are based on these reports and the Basel III workbook published by the Basel 
Committee. However, there exist some differences between CRD IV and the Basel III 
framework and since CRD IV is the legal framework for UK banks, we have followed their 
guidelines when differences occur. Our calculations are done for the years; 2000, 2006 and 
2009-2012. The calculation for 2012 is conducted to see whether our calculations are 
comparable to the calculations done by the sample banks. 
Table 6: CET1 calculations for HSBC 
Common equity tier 1 US$m REF: 2012 2011 2010 2009 2006 2000
Called up share capital 1 9 238         8 934         8 843         8 705         5 786         4 634         
Share premium 2 8 679         7 052         7 049         7 008         7 789         3 305         
Retained earnings 3 120 347    111 868    99 105       88 737       65 397       26 234       
Accumulated other comprehensive income 4 29 722       23 615       25 414       16 593       29 380       11 397       
Minority interest (amount allowed in 
consolidated CET 1 ) 5 2 049         1 815         1 808         1 719         1 709         818            
CET 1 before regulatory adjustments 170 035    153 284    142 219    122 762    110 061     46 388       
Regulatory adjustments
Goodwill and intangible assets 6 -25 733     -27 419     -28 001     -28 680     -35 786     -15 089     
Fair value reserves related to gains or losses on 
cash flow hedges 7 -13             95               285            26               101             -             
Negative amounts resulting from from the 
calculation of exp. loss amounts 8 -6 168       -5 692       -6 200       -6 750       -9 016        -3 850       
Defined benefit pension fund assets 9 -2 617       -2 237       -             -             -             -             
Direct and indirect holdings by an institution of 
own CET 1 instruments 10 -1 322       -844           -1 089       -1 089       -1 089        -673           
Reciprocal cross holdings (material holdings) 11 -9 436       -7 496       -7 470       -6 034       -3 779        -736           
Deferred tax assets that rely on future 
profitability excluding temporary differences 12 -617           -1 328       -348           -407           -             -             
Gains or losses on liabilities at fair value 
resulting from own credit 13 112            -3 608       -889           -1 050       -             -             
Additional value adjustments 14 -2 092       -1 886       -1 750       -1 510       -1 354        -571           
Total regulatory adjustments -47 886     -50 415     -45 461     -45 494     -50 923     -20 919     
Common Equity Tier 1 122 149    102 869    96 758       77 268       59 138       25 469       
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Table 6 shows the calculation for HSBC and the exact same calculations have been done for 
the three other banks which can be found in appendix 11.2. Calculated CET1 for all banks 
are summarised in table 8.  
In the explanations to each line in the calculation we have some places cited paragraphs from 
the revised Basel III framework as of 2011.  
1. Called up share capital 
For all banks this is extracted directly from the annual reports under changes in equity. 
2. Share premium 
Share premium is found in all our sample banks’ annual reports under “Changes in equity”. 
For HSBC and Standard Chartered there has been an adjustment for preference share 
premium which is not eligible CET1 capital and was found in the Pillar 3 reports. For 2006 
and 2000 we cannot find any adjustment or information relating to preference share 
premium, hence this is assumed to be zero.  
3. Retained earnings 
For all banks this is extracted directly from the annual reports under changes in equity. 
4. Accumulated other comprehensive income (and other reserves) 
Called up share capital, share premium and retained earnings are deducted from total equity 
and the remaining is added as accumulated other comprehensive income. This is then 
adjusted for other equity instruments classified as Tier 1 capital, and equal to the calculation 
done under Basel II. However, only HSBC has other equity instruments to be deducted.  
5. Non-controlling interest 
The calculation of minority interests allowed under Basel III is very similar to the calculation 
under Basel II, but with one adjustment; excess non-controlling interests are to be deducted. 
The set-up used for this calculation is the same as HSBC used in their Pillar 3 report from 
2012: 
Total non-controlling interest 
Less: Other Tier 1 capital - preference shares 
Less: Other Tier 1 capital - reserve capital instruments 
Less: transitional impact (excess) 
Less: Non-controlling Tier 2 capital 
Other regulatory adjustments 
= Minority interest allowed in CET1 
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LBG has no specific note on the minority interests and in their calculation of fully loaded 
CRD IV they do not allow for minority interests to be added to CET1. In their Pillar 3 report 
from 2012 they claim; “Non-controlling interests are no longer eligible for inclusion”. This 
is therefore assumed to be zero for all relevant years.  
For HSBC we calculated the preference shares by summarising all non-cumulative preferred 
securities issued by subsidiaries under the note “Non-controlling interests”, and for Barclays 
we can find the value directly in the note for non-controlling interests. Standard Chartered 
has no information on preference shares, but they have Tier 1 capital included in non-
controlling interest which we have deducted under the line “Other Tier 1 capital – reserve 
capital instruments”. For the year 2000 we did not find any information of preference shares 
or reserve capital instruments, and as a precautionary estimate this is assumed it to be zero 
for all banks. 
The transitional impact from Basel II to Basel III is excess minority interest and how to 
calculate this can be found in the Basel III framework paragraph 62. The information 
necessary for this calculation is not available; hence our calculation of excess minority 
interest is just a simplification where we assumed excess to be the same fraction of total non-
controlling interest as in 2012. This method is used for all banks, and the excess minority 
interests for 2012 are found in the Pillar 3 reports. 
Other deductions are made in relation with the Basel II deductions, which are extracted from 
annual reports and pillar 3 reports. 
6. Intangible assets and goodwill 
“Goodwill and other intangibles (except mortgage servicing rights) 
67. Goodwill and all other intangibles must be deducted in the calculation of Common 
Equity Tier 1, including any goodwill included in the valuation of significant investments in 
the capital of banking, financial and insurance entities that are outside the scope of 
regulatory consolidation...” (BCBS, 2011b) 
Intangibles are to be deducted net of deferred tax, but there are no specifications for deferred 
tax liabilities related to goodwill and intangible assets, hence we cannot calculate net of tax. 
However, paragraph 49 (xv) in the Basel II framework states that Goodwill should be 
deducted from capital, and we can therefore use the same values that were deducted under 
Basel II rules for all banks.  
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7. Cash flow hedging reserve 
“Cash flow hedge reserve 
71. The amount of the cash flow hedge reserve that relates to the hedging of items that are 
not fair valued on the balance sheet (including projected cash flows) should be derecognised 
in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1. This means that positive amounts should be 
deducted and negative amounts should be added back.” (BCBS, 2011b) 
Cash flow hedging reserves are collected directly from changes in equity in the annual 
reports.  
8. Shortfall of provisions to expected losses 
“Shortfall of the stock of provisions to expected losses 
73. The deduction from capital in respect of a shortfall of the stock of provisions to expected 
losses under the IRB approach should be made in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1. 
The full amount is to be deducted and should not be reduced by any tax effects that could be 
expected to occur if provisions were to rise to the level of expected losses.” (BCBS, 2011b) 
Under Basel II 50% of excess of expected losses over impairment allowances are deducted 
from Core Tier 1. Under Basel III 100% are to be deducted from CET1. We use the numbers 
from Basel II multiplied with two and make sure this is gross of tax. 
9. Defined benefit pension fund assets 
“Defined benefit pension fund assets and liabilities 
76. Defined benefit pension fund liabilities, as included on the balance sheet, must be fully 
recognised in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1 (ie Common Equity Tier 1 cannot be 
increased through derecognising these liabilities)…” (BCBS, 2011b) 
Numbers are found in the annual reports under the notes relating to pensions, and to 
calculate net pension assets we have used this setup: 
 
 
 
If net pension fund assets are negative, this will not be added to CET1 but the defined benefit 
pension adjustment will be zero.  
Fair value of plan assets 
 - Present value of obligations 
 - Unrecognised actuarial gains 
 + Unrecognised prior service cost 
 = Net pension assets 
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10. Investments in own shares (treasury stock) 
“Investments in own shares (treasury stock) 
78. All of a bank’s investments in its own common shares, whether held directly or 
indirectly, will be deducted in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1 (unless already 
derecognised under the relevant accounting standards). In addition, any own stock which 
the bank could be contractually obliged to purchase should be deducted in the calculation of 
Common Equity Tier 1…” (BCBS, 2011b) 
Neither in the annual reports, the pillar 3 reports nor statements to shareholders are there 
reported information on investments in own shares. We then used the database “Orbis” to 
find own ownership, and used the last reported percentage for each year. The ownership 
percentages are very small, especially for Standard Chartered and LBG. These two banks did 
not have any deductions related to investment in own shares in their Pillar 3 report, and we 
will not make any deductions either. For HSBC and Barclays small values where deducted 
from CET1in 2012, and for previous years an estimate based on the changes in their own 
ownership has been made. 
11. Reciprocal cross holdings in the capital of banking, financial and insurance entities 
(Unconsolidated investments) 
“79. Reciprocal cross holdings of capital that are designed to artificially inflate the capital 
position of banks will be deducted in full. Banks must apply a “corresponding deduction 
approach” to such investments in the capital of other banks, other financial institutions and 
insurance entities. This means the deduction should be applied to the same component of 
capital for which the capital would qualify if it was issued by the bank itself.” (BCBS, 
2011b) 
Paragraph 79 is the main rule, but further down in the Basel III framework, in paragraph 87, 
some threshold deductions are specified: 
Instead of a full deduction, the following items may each receive limited recognition when 
calculating Common Equity Tier 1, with recognition capped at 10% of the bank’s common 
equity (after the application of all regulatory adjustments). 
 Significant investments in the common shares of unconsolidated financial 
institutions. 
 Mortgage servicing rights 
 DTAs that arise from temporary differences. 
 39 
Barclays and Standard Chartered 
Under Basel II both banks deducted 50% of material holdings from Tier 1 and 50% from 
Tier 2 capital, where material holdings are unconsolidated investments in financial 
companies. Under Basel III unconsolidated investments will only be deducted if the total 
(100%) exceeds the threshold of 10% of CET1, before this deduction is made. The amount 
not exceeding the threshold will be risk weighted. 
HSBC and LBG 
Under Basel II, HSBC and LBG have deducted unconsolidated investments from both Tier 1 
Capital and Tier 2 Capital, but not 50% from each. According to HSBC’s Pillar 3 report 
2012 some of their unconsolidated investments are deducted from Total Capital, but no other 
information relating to this is available. HSBC has deducted 50,3% of total unconsolidated 
investments from CET1 under fully implemented CRD IV rules in 2012 as significant 
investments (ownership above 10%). The same percentage will be used for the other relevant 
years, and the same method has been used in the calculation for LBG. The residual amount 
of total unconsolidated investments that are not deducted will be risk weighted. 
12. Deferred tax 
“Deferred tax assets 
69. Deferred tax assets (DTAs) that rely on future profitability of the bank to be realized are 
to be deducted in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1. Deferred tax assets may be 
netted with associated deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) only if the DTAs and DTLs relate to 
taxes levied by the same taxation authority and offsetting is permitted by the relevant 
taxation authority…” (BCBS, 2011b) 
Under the notes related to tax or deferred tax there are some specifications of DTAs that rely 
on future profitability (tax losses carried forward), but the values are not the exact values 
deducted from CET1 in the Pillar 3 reports. Given that banks do not have more detailed 
information of their DTAs that rely on future profitability, the values they have specified in 
their annual reports are deducted from CET1. 
13. Own credit-spread 
Cumulative gains and losses due to changes in own credit risk on fair valued financial 
liabilities is to be deducted from CET1. This rule ensures that an increase in credit risk of a 
bank does not lead to a reduction in the value of its liabilities, and thereby an increase in 
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common equity. The adjustment of own credit from Basel II rules to Basel III rules is the 
debit valuation adjustment (DVA); 
“An adjustment made by an entity to the valuation of OTC derivative liabilities to reflect 
within fair value the entity’s own credit risk” (BCBS, 2011a) 
The deduction requires deducting the spread premium over the risk free rate for derivative 
liabilities. In effect, this would require banks to value their derivatives for CET1 purposes as 
if they were risk free and deduct the unrealised gains both at inception of the derivative and 
afterwards, when the creditworthiness of the bank deteriorates (BCBS, 2011b). This is not 
possible for us to calculate exactly. 
DVAs can be netted against own credit, but since both LBG and Standard Chartered have 
their DVA under additional value adjustments, we will do the same for HSBC and Barclays. 
Hence the adjustment for own credit will be the same as under Basel II for all banks, and 
additional value adjustments will contain DVAs for all sample banks. 
14. Additional value adjustments 
Additional valuation adjustments, referred to as prudent valuation adjustments or PVAs, are 
related to fair value calculations; “Where the accounting fair value calculated under IFRSs 
is higher than the valuation amount resulting from the application of the prudential 
adjustments, this would result in an additional valuation adjustment or PVA deduction from 
CET1 capital.” (HSBC, 2013b) 
Same as for the DVAs we will not try to calculate this, but we assume that total additional 
value adjustments (PVAs and DVAs) will be a constant fraction of CET1 before regulatory 
adjustments. By using 2012 CET1 numbers we find that additional value adjustments only 
accounts for a small fraction of CET1, hence this will not have a major effect on the 
calculated CET1. 
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 Findings 4.2
CET1 
capital 2012 
HSBC 
US $m 
Barclays 
£m 
LBG 
£m 
Standard Chartered 
US $m 
Reported 
CET1 
122 503 39 769 26 224
3
 33 988
3 
Calculated 
CET1 
122 149 39 521 26 190 33 959 
Table 7: CET1 capital 2012 
The reported CET1 values are very close to the values from our calculations, and the 
difference is less than 1% for each banks. The small differences can be an indication of the 
accuracy in our CET1 estimates for previous years, and we believe that further calculations 
based on these estimates will be relatively valid. However, we will emphasise that the 
calculations for year 2000 are based on less available information than the other years. The 
annual reports and other financial documents were much less extensive; hence the 
calculations for 2000 are based on more assumptions than for other years.  
The values of CET1 are shown in table 8, which show an increasing trend. For 2012 and 
2013 we use reported values on CET1 from the Pillar 3 reports (but including securitisation 
positions for LBG and Standard Chartered), and for the previous years we will use the CET1 
from our calculations.  
CET1 capital 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2006 2000 
HSBC US$m 125 425 122 503 102 869 96 758 77 268 59 138 25 469 
Barclays £m 38 059 39 769 38 908 38 817 35 184 14 649 8 669 
LBG £m 28 729 26 224 26 408 28 560 26 242 8 207 6 687 
Standard 
Chartered US$m 
35 256 33 988 30 232 27 932 17 837 10 066 5 096 
Table 8: Sample banks’ CET1 capital 
Before the fully implemented CET1 ratios can be calculated, risk weighted assets has to be 
estimated based on fully implemented CRD IV rules. These calculations will be presented in 
the next chapter. 
                                                          
3 Under CRD IV securitisation positions will be risk weighted. However, LBG and Standard Chartered deducted their 
securitisation positions from CET1, while we have added them back and risk weighted them (see chapter 5). For LBG the 
reported CET1 was £ 25 858m but we added back securitisations positions of £ 366m. The reported CET1 for Standard 
Chartered was US$ 33 752m but we added back securitisation positions of US$ 236m, hence the value of US$ 33 988m.  
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5. Calculation of Risk Weighted Assets 
The implementation of Basel III through CRD IV implies several adjustments in the 
calculation of RWA. For half-year 2013 and full-year 2012, our sample banks had to some 
extent, reported their estimated RWA assuming fully implemented CRD IV rules. However, 
calculating the accurate and comparable numbers for previous years is complicated. Most 
large banks use Internal Rate Based (IRB) methods which we do not have info to replicate. 
In this chapter we calculate RWA assuming fully implemented CRD IV rules for years 
previous to 2012. The effect on RWA due to Basel III will be analysed to see if our sample 
banks have adjusted to these changes. The estimates retrieved from these calculations will be 
further used in chapter 6. 
 Method 5.1
To get an estimate of the Basel III RWA previous to 2012 (when not reported) the different 
effects are analysed by best effort. There is a difference of how detailed the increases in 
RWA due to Basel III are reported, but when applicable these adjustments have been used to 
identify similar deduction for previous years. The calculation from Basel II RWA to Basel 
III RWA will be structured like table 9
4
, which shows the calculation for HSBC. 
Calculations for the other three banks are similar and can be found in appendix 11.3.  
 
Table 9: Calculation of Basel III RWA; HSBC 
1. Securitisation positions 
This effect relates to securitisation positions previously deducted 50% from Core Tier 1 and 
50% from Tier 1, but under Basel III this have to be risk weighted with 1250%. The numbers 
are extracted from the Pillar 3 reports. 
                                                          
4 Calculations for 2000 and 2006 are based on same percentages as 2009. See appendix 11.3. 
HSBC US $m 2013 % 2012 % 2011 % 2010 % 2009 %
Reported Basel II 1 104 764  1 123 943  1 209 514 1 103 113 1 133 168 
Definition of capital calculated
1. Securitisation Positions (50/50) 43 843        4,0 % 44 906        4,0 % 30 175,00 2,5 % 36 675,00 3,3 % 39 475,00 3,5 %
2. Threshold 36 775        3,3 % 45 940        4,1 % 39 343       3,3 % 40 140       3,6 % 41 640       3,7 %
3. Other; moved to deduction DTA -8 187        -0,7 % -8 976        -0,8 % -9 659        -0,8 % -8 810        -0,8 % -9 050        -0,8 %
4. CVA 38 339        3,5 % 60 360        5,4 % 64 955       5,4 % 59 241       5,4 % 60 855       5,4 %
5. AVC 25 769        2,3 % 25 682        2,3 % 27 637       2,3 % 25 206       2,3 % 25 893       2,3 %
Basel III 1 241 303  12,4 % 1 291 855  14,9 % 1 361 965 13 % 1 255 565 14 % 1 291 982 14 %
Reported numbers
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2. The threshold effect  
The threshold effect relates to unconsolidated investments in financial entities and Deferred 
Tax Assets (DTAs) that arise from temporary differences. The Basel III framework requires 
that the amount that does not exceed the 10% threshold is risk weighted with 250%. 
Unconsolidated investments that are not deducted from CET1 in chapter 4 are risk weighted. 
The DTAs have been estimated based on the DTA added to RWA in 2012, and then adjusted 
for year-to-year change in total deferred tax assets.  
3. Other effects 
Other effects of Basel III are related to items previously risk weighted under Basel II but that 
now will be deducted from CET1 and thereby reducing RWA. The “other” effect is based on 
the percentages deducted from RWA in 2012 and 2013, were the IRB methods have been 
used. 
4-5. Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) 
As previously stated, Basel III has increased the risk weighting of Counterparty Credit Risk 
(CCR). There is a new capital charge for credit value adjustments (CVA) and a larger charge 
on credit risk due to higher assets value correlation (AVC) against the exposure to large 
financial institutions. It is not possible to calculate an accurate value due to the IRB-methods 
used for this, and the lack of information regarding different risk-factors and credit rating of 
exposure.  
HSBC is the only bank that has specified the “other” effect. For the three other banks, the 
CCR and the “other”-effect is difficult to calculate and have been merged in our calculation. 
In our sample the CCR will have a bigger effect than the “other” adjustment and the net 
effect of these two have been an increase in RWA. The percentage increase in RWA due to 
these items in 2012 will be used on previous years.  
5.1.1 The European Banking Authority (EBA) exercise 
In September 2013 the European Banking Authority (EBA) presented their results from the 
monitoring exercise of the implications of Basel III based on data from December 2012. 
Table 10 shows the different impacts on the total RWA displayed for two different groups; 
Group 1 and Group 2 banks. Group 1 banks are defined as” banks with Tier 1 capital over 
€3bn and are international active” (EBA, 2013) and all of the banks in our sample fall into 
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this category. This EBA exercise is based on a sample of 170 banks, and the results only 
show average changes in RWA (EBA, 2013). 
EBA  Group 1 banks Group 2 Banks 
Total increase Basel II to Basel III 12,8 % 10,2% 
of which; Definition of capital   
50/50: Securitisation Positions 2,8 % 4,7% 
threshold 3,4 % 2,3% 
other -1,0 % -0,5% 
Counterparty credit risk   
CVA 6,0 % 2,9% 
AVC 1,6 % 0,8% 
Table 10: Increase in RWA at a general level in 2012 presented by EBA (EBA, 2013) 
We could have used these percentage changes in our calculation of RWA, but because of 
differences between the sample banks, they will not be representative and show the different 
impacts of Basel III. Our sample banks are different regarding business segments and 
international exposure, and Basel III will affect them differently. 
Findings 
Calculated increases from Basel II RWA to Basel III RWA are presented in table 11.  The 
new framework leads to increased RWA, but the impact is different for each bank. HSBC 
and Barclays have significantly larger increases compared to LBG and Standard Chartered, 
but for all sample banks the impact is declining from 2009 to 2013. This decline can indicate 
that our sample banks have done some adjustments to reduce the impact of Basel III on 
RWA. 
 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2006 2000 
HSBC 12,4 % 14,9 % 12,6 % 13,8 % 14,0 % 14,0 % 14,0 % 
Barclays 21,8 % 21,0 % 25,4 % 29,7 % 33,3 % 33,3 % 33,3 % 
LBG 4,3 % 5,0 % 4,7 % 4,6 % 4,9 % 4,9 % 4,9 % 
Standard Chartered 2,9 % 5,5 % 5,7 % 6,1 % 6,6 % 6,6 % 6,6 % 
Table 11: Percentage increase in RWA due to Basel III 
The detailed findings for each bank will be further discussed in the following sections. And 
the calculations are in appendix 11.3  
HSBC 
The increases in RWA are largely driven by the increase in Counterparty Credit Risk 
(includes both CVA and AVC) which in 2013 accounts for almost 50% of the increase 
(2012: 52%). This is as expected because HSBC is a large international bank with a 
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significant exposure to corporate and investment banking where CCR is high. The increases 
are quite stable and no significant adjustments in RWA can be found. 
Barclays 
Barclays has the largest percentage increases in RWA for all years, and the increases are 
primarily driven by CCR which in 2013 accounted for 64% of the total increase. This large 
increase due to CCR has to be viewed in context with Barclays’ large share in investment 
banking. 
The percentage increase has gone down from 33,3% in 2009 to 21% in 2012. This is 
primarily driven by a reduction in securitisation positions, which in 2009 accounted for an 
increase in RWA of 18,3% but in 2012 only lead to an increase of 7,8%. This can indicate 
that Barclays have adjusted their securitisation positions as a result of the implementation of 
Basel III.  
LBG 
The increases in RWA for LBG are not large compared to HSBC and Barclays. LBG is 
primarily a retail bank, and retail banks normally have lower exposure to securitisation 
positions and counterparty credit risk (Harle, et al., 2010). Over these years LBG have 
reduced their securitisation positions which in 2009 counted for an increase of 2.9% 
compared to 1.5% in 2012.  This can indicate that LBG have adjusted their securitisation 
positions to reduce the Basel III effect on RWA. But the main driver of the increase in RWA 
is the threshold effect of unconsolidated investments. 
Standard Chartered 
Standard Chartered also has a smaller increase in RWA than HSBC and Barclays, and the 
increases have been smaller each year. The reduction in unconsolidated investments is the 
main driver for this reduced effect of Basel III; in 2009 unconsolidated investments lead to 
an increase in RWA of 2,1% (32% of the total increase) and in 2012 the increase was only 
1,1% (20% of the total increase). Still, the biggest impact on RWA in 2012 is the CCR 
which can be due to their large international exposure. 
As seen for all sample banks the effect of Basel III will increase RWA because the new 
requirements lead to stricter risk management, especially related to CCR, securitisation 
positions and unconsolidated investments. The increases are biggest for HSBC and Barclays, 
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which are the largest banks in our sample and have large investment banking segments and 
securitisation positions.  
The downward trend, seen for all sample banks can be an indication that they have made 
some adjustments to reduce the impact on RWA. Especially for Barclays there is a 
significant reduction in securitisation positions.  
Compared to the EBA monitoring exercise we find some difference; Standard Chartered and 
LBG have a lower increase than the average increase of 12,8% presented by EBA, whereas 
Barclays have significantly higher increases. 
The estimates of RWA assuming fully implemented CRD IV (table 12) are the values that 
will be used in chapter 6. However, we will not be able to conduct more detailed analyses of 
the Basel III RWA because of insufficient information.  
RWA  
Basel III 
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2006 2000 
HSBC US 
$m 
1 241 303 1 291 855 1 361 965 1 255 565 1 291 982 1 070 234 437 461 
Barclays £m 471 530 468 000 490 242 516 396 510 178 397 091 196 043 
LBG £m 301 006 325 672 368 656 424 929 517 263 163 621 98 565 
Standard 
Chartered  
US $m 
333 181 318 389 285 985 259 911 228 043 163 571 73 919 
Table 12: Basel III RWA 
 Weaknesses 5.2
For 2012 and half-year 2013 we use our sample banks’ reported estimates, but this may not 
be accurate as they in many cases are based upon the banks interpretations of the framework. 
The main uncertainty relates to CCR and the “other” effects which depend on IRB-methods. 
For the estimates of 2000 and 2006 there is not sufficient information to calculate 
securitisation positions and threshold effects for all of our sample banks.  
Alternative approaches have been considered. One alternative was to use the average 
increase from the EBA monitoring exercises but since these are average numbers and our 
banks are quite different this is not considered a more precise measurement. The other 
alternative was to use Basel II numbers, but since it is clear that the RWA will increase for 
all banks under the new regulation this is also not an optimal solution.  
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6. Calculation of ratios 
Calculations in this chapter are based on our previous estimates of CET1 and RWA. In 
addition to calculation of CET1 ratios, we compare CET1 to equity and assets, and RWA to 
assets, which will be basis for our analysis of numerator and denominator. 
CET1 ratio 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2006 2000 Increase 
HSBC 10,1% 9,5% 7,6% 7,7% 6,0% 5,5% 5,8% 73,6% 
Barclays 8,1% 8,5% 7,9% 7,5% 6,9% 3,7% 4,4% 82,5% 
LBG 9,5% 8,1% 7,2% 6,7% 5,1% 5,0% 6,8% 40,7% 
Standard 
Chartered 
10,6% 10,7% 10,6% 10,8% 7,8% 6,2% 6,9% 53,5% 
Average 9,6% 9,2% 8,3% 8,2% 6,4% 5,1% 6,0% 60,1% 
Table 13: CET1 ratios 
The CET1 ratios have gone up, and the sample banks have been able to adjust to stricter 
requirements. From 2000 the average increase has been 60,1%, but if we look at the average 
increase from 2006 the increase has been even higher due to lower capital ratios just before 
the financial crisis.  
CET1 to 
equity 
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2006 2000 Increase 
HSBC 68,8% 66,9% 61,9% 62,5% 57,0% 51,5% 48,2% 42,8% 
Barclays 63,3% 63,2% 59,7% 62,3% 60,2% 53,5% 36,9% 71,5% 
LBG 65,8% 58,7% 56,7% 60,9% 59,5% 71,3% 68,7% -4,2% 
Standard 
Chartered 
77,7% 73,8% 73,1% 71,9% 63,9% 57,9% 67,0% 16,1% 
Average 68,9% 65,6% 62,8% 64,4% 60,1% 58,5% 55,2% 24,9% 
Table 14: CET1 to equity 
CET1 capital compared to equity can be an indication of the quality of equity. CET1 is the 
bank’s core capital and only consists of the highest quality capital. Except for LBG all banks 
have increased the quality of their equity, and on average CET1 to equity has increased 
24,9%. In the next chapter, we analyse in more detail changes in equity. 
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CET1 to 
assets 
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2006 2000 Increase 
HSBC 4,7% 4,5% 4,0% 3,9% 3,3% 3,2% 3,8% 25,4% 
Barclays 2,5% 2,7% 2,5% 2,6% 2,6% 1,5% 2,7% -9,4% 
LBG 3,3% 2,8% 2,7% 2,9% 2,6% 2,4% 3,1% 6,8% 
Standard 
Chartered 
5,4% 5,3% 5,1% 5,4% 4,1% 3,8% 4,7% 14,5% 
Average 4,0% 3,8% 3,6% 3,7% 3,1% 2,7% 3,6% 11,1% 
Table 15: CET1 to total assets 
By comparing CET1 to total assets the increase is not nearly as large as the average increase 
in the CET1 ratio. This can indicate that the numerator, CET1, has not been the biggest 
driver in the increase of CET1 ratios. 
RWA to 
assets 
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2006 2000 Increase 
HSBC 46,9% 48,0% 53,3% 51,1% 54,6% 57,5% 64,9% -27,7% 
Barclays 30,8% 31,4% 31,4% 34,7% 37,0% 39,8% 62,0% -50,4% 
LBG 34,3% 35,2% 38,0% 42,9% 50,4% 47,6% 45,2% -24,1% 
Standard 
Chartered 
51,3% 50,0% 48,3% 50,2% 52,2% 61,5% 68,7% -25,4% 
Average 40,8% 41,2% 42,7% 44,7% 48,6% 51,6% 60,2% -32,2% 
Table 16: RWA to total assets 
Except for LBG all banks have increased their total assets, but as a percentage of total assets 
the RWA has been reduced; on average 32,2%. This means that our sample banks have 
reduced the riskiness of their assets. Banks can reduce the riskiness of their assets by taking 
one or more of the following actions:  
 Change the balance sheet structure or the riskiness within each class of assets 
 Reduce their exposure to GIIPS or other highly risk weighted assets 
 Change the maturity of their assets 
 Change their business structure; some businesses are more affected by Basel III than 
others. 
The increase in CET1 ratios is primarily due to a reduction of RWA, which is in context with 
the results from the EBA monitoring exercise from September 2013; they did not find 
significant increases in CET1 in percentage terms but a notable decrease of RWA (EBA, 
2013). The findings from this exercise are in figure 1.  
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Findings 
The sample banks have increased their CET1 ratios and the main driver has been a reduction 
of the denominator, RWA. In the next two chapters we analyse the constituents of equity and 
assets to find the underlying reasons for increases in the quality of equity and the reduction 
of RWA. 
Figure 1: Development of CET1, RWA and exposure. Extracted from 
the Basel III monitoring exercise (EBA, 2013) 
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Figure 2: Composition of equity 
7. Analysis of Equity 
In the previous chapter we found that CET1 compared to equity increased. CET1 over equity 
was on average for the sample banks 55,2% in 2000 and 65,6% in 2012. Except for LBG all 
sample banks have increased the quality of their equity. Of the constituents of equity only 
called up share capital, share premium and retained earnings can be added directly to CET1 
without any noteworthy adjustments or deductions, and CET1 primarily consists of these 
elements. In this section we look at the composition of equity, to understand how CET1 is 
changing.  
For analysis purposes equity has been divided into six categories and the allocations of 
equity for each bank are presented in figure 2.  
 
Share premium and called up share capital 
For both HSBC and Barclays share premium and called up share capital has been relatively 
stable over the last years and there have not been any large increases. LBG had a large 
increase in called up share capital and share premium from 2006 to 2009, which was mainly 
due to the issuance of new shares related to the acquisition of HBOS in 2009. Standard 
Chartered issued shares in august 2009 which increased share capital by US$ 65m. They also 
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conducted a 1-for-8 rights issue in 2010, but the increase relating to this is presented under 
merger reserves. 
Retained earnings 
In the last years LBG had negative earnings leading to a reduction in retained earnings and a 
payout ratio of zero from 2009. In 2012 retained earnings accounted for only 16% of LBG’s 
total equity.  HSBC, Barclays and Standard Chartered have all increased their retained 
earnings which has been the main driver for increases in total equity. Retained earnings 
accounted for 66%, 60% and 58% of equity for HSBC, Barclays and Standard Chartered in 
2012. These three banks have managed this by generating positive profits and for HSBC and 
Barclays payout ratios have been reduced. Standard Chartered has not reduced payout ratios, 
but since the ratios have been relatively low they have managed to increase retained 
earnings.  
Payout ratios   2012  2011  2010  2009  2006  
HSBC 55,4% 42,4% 46,6% 100,0% 62,3% 
Barclays 19,0% 22,0% 19,0% 2,9% 43,1% 
LBG 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 68,7% 
Standard Chartered 28,8% 23,8% 17,2% 21,9% 22,0% 
Table 17: Payout ratios 
Other reserves 
For HSBC the decrease primarily relates to a reduction of foreign exchange reserves, but the 
effect on equity has not been significant as this is a small fraction of other reserves. For 
HSBC other reserves accounted for 16% of equity, while for Barclays other reserves only 
accounted for 6% in 2012 and there has not been any large changes related to this post.  
LBG has increased other reserves from 3% in 2006 to 29% in 2012 which is mainly due to 
the increase in merger reserves related to the acquisition of HBOS in 2009. There is also a 
large increase in capital redemption reserves from 2009-2010. However this amount is 
transferred from share capital following the cancellation of the deferred shares related to the 
merger, which does not increase total equity. 
Standard Chartered increased merger reserves over 5 billion due to a 1-for-8 rights issue. 
Except for this, there have not been any large changes and other reserves constituted 26% of 
total equity in 2012, which is close to the 2006 fraction of 25%.  
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Findings 
HSBC and Barclays have increased the quality of their equity over the relevant years which 
are mainly due to increases in retained earnings and reduced payout ratios. They have also 
reduced non-controlling interests, which are bigger than for the other two banks. The reason 
for this reduction can be that only a small fraction of minority interests are allowed in CET1, 
and one way to increase CET1 can be to buy out minority stakes.  
LBG had already in year 2000 a high quality on their equity with CET1 accounting for 
68,7%. This was primarily because of a high share of retained earnings; 71% and 72% in 
2006 and 2000 respectively. After several years with losses, retained earnings decreased 
leading to lower CET1 compared to equity. But because their equity is mostly composed by 
called up share capital, share premium and other reserves, mainly merger reserves, LBG still 
manage to have a high quality on their equity.  
Despite Standard Chartered’s high share of other reserves they managed to have the highest 
fraction of CET1 to equity in 2012, which relate to merger reserves’ large fraction of other 
reserves. 
Except for LBG, CET1 has increased for all banks, which is mainly through improved 
quality of equity. This means that the increase in the numerator in the CET1 ratio can be 
explained by increased retained earnings. In the next chapter we look into the reduction of 
the denominator, RWA. 
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8. Analysis of Assets 
In the calculations from chapter 6 we could see that CET1 ratios on average had increased 
60% from 2000 to 2012, but CET1 capital to assets has only increased 11,1% on average. 
When comparing RWA to assets we find that the Basel III RWA has decreased 32% to 
assets over the same period. This indicates that the increases in CET1 ratios are primarily 
due to reductions of RWA, which can indicate that banks have changed their asset 
composition, lowering risk. A detailed analysis of our sample banks’ assets might find the 
adjustments they have made to accomplish this. The analyses of assets will be done by 
looking at: 
 Balance sheet structure of assets 
 Exposure to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS)  
 Maturity of assets 
 Assets by business 
o Have they changed the type of business segment they operate in? 
o RWA by business. 
These analyses are conducted based on Basel II RWA because we do not have detailed 
information of the Basel III RWA. However, the negative trend in RWA/assets are the same 
for both which can be seen in figure 3.  
Figure 3: Movement of RWA compared to assets 
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 Balance sheet assets 8.1
Balance sheet restructuring can be used to improve the quality of capital and to reduce the 
capital needs arising from Basel III’s deductions and higher risk weighted assets (Harle, et 
al., 2010). 
For analysis purposes we have divided assets into seven groups, and the allocations of assets 
are presented in figure 4. 
 
The biggest increase for all sample banks is in “Cash and balances at central banks”. For 
2000 and 2006 this was close to zero for all banks while in 2012 this constituted over 5% of 
total assets for all banks. This is mainly due to the western central banks trying to improve 
the money markets after the financial crisis. Cash and balances at central banks have a zero 
risk weight; hence the increase in this asset has reduced RWA to assets (BCBS, 2004). 
  
Figure 4: Composition of assets 
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Financial assets 
All banks have had relatively stable fraction of financial assets over the relevant period. 
HSBC and Barclays have the highest share of financial assets; in 2012 they had 34% and 
29,8% respectively, while LBG and Standard Chartered have 20,8% and 20% in 2012. 
Derivative financial instruments 
All banks have zero derivatives in year 2000, but this can be due to a classification 
difference, meaning that derivatives might have been classified as financial assets. In 2012 
Barclays have the highest share of 31,5% while HSBC, LBG and Standard Chartered have 
much lower shares with 13%, 6,1% and 8% respectively.  
Loans and advances to banks 
All banks have reduced this from year 2000, and Standard Chartered have the highest share 
in 2012 with 11% while Barclays has the lowest share with only 3%.  
Loans and advances to customers 
From year 2000 all banks have reduced their share of loans and advances to customers, and 
in 2012 Barclays had the lowest share with 28,6% and LBG had the highest share with 
55,9%. This underpins the difference between these two banks; Barclays focuses on 
commercial banking while LBG is more retail focused. 
Goodwill and intangible assets 
We wanted to look more closely at this because they have to deduct intangible assets from 
CET1 capital. However none of the banks have very high values on intangibles and there 
have not been any large changes. 
Other assets 
There has not been any large changes related this for any of the banks in our sample. 
Findings 
HSBC and Barclays have a much higher share of financial assets and derivatives than the 
two other banks, where Barclays has the biggest share of derivatives. LBG and Standard 
Chartered have a much higher share of loans and advances to customers. This corresponds to 
the fact that both LBG and Standard Chartered are more retailed focused than HSBC and 
Barclays. 
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Barclays has the lowest share of RWA to assets with 31,4% in 2012. They have worked hard 
to reduce RWA and this ratio has decreased with over 50% from 2000. Standard Chartered is 
the bank with the highest RWA/assets ratio, where RWA accounted for 50% of their assets 
in 2012, and they have not been able to reduce as much as Barclays. 
Based on the analysis of the balance sheet structure we cannot find any indications of how 
they have adjusted their assets to reduce RWA or why Barclays manage to have very low 
RWA compared to assets. The reduction in RWA can be due to changes on a more detailed 
level. For example, they can have changed their lending policies, which might change the 
composition of “Loans and advances to customers”. Banks might be stricter regarding whom 
to lend money and there can also be changes related to what type of businesses that gets 
loan; Small start-up firms can have a higher risk weight than middle-sized firms. We would, 
if possible, done a more detailed analysis but information regarding loans to businesses is 
not sufficient. The same can be applied for financial assets and derivatives; they can have 
changed the compositions of these assets but this is not visible on the balance sheet, and 
public information is not sufficient for us to make a more detailed analysis on the balance 
sheet structure. 
The next analysis will be on their exposure to countries with low credit rating, which gets a 
high risk weight. 
 Exposure to GIIPS  8.2
We calculate the net exposures to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS). Banks 
monitor this closely because of the volatility 
in the Eurozone, and the increased credit and 
market risk related to exposures in these 
countries.  
From 2010 and 2011 our sample banks 
reported exposures to GIIPS in their annual 
reports. Barclays and LBG have the highest 
reported exposures to these countries, but 
there is a clear downward trend. HSBC and 
Standard Chartered do not have any reported 
Figure 5: Net exposure to GIIPS as a 
fraction of total assets 
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values for 2010 and they have a much lower exposure compared to total assets than the two 
other banks. 
Reducing exposure to these countries will help reduce RWA. But the exposures are a small 
fraction of total assets, and can therefore only explain some of the reduction in RWA for 
Barclays and LBG.  
Next we look closer at the maturity structure of assets, as a reduction in maturity can reduce 
RWA.  
 Maturity of assets 8.3
Assets and liabilities have different maturities and empirical evidence indicate that long-term 
credits are riskier than short-term credits (BCBS, 2005). As mentioned in section 2.4.1, 
banks have to take into account the effective maturity of assets when using IRB approaches. 
Because longer terms are associated with higher risk, the capital requirements increase with 
maturity. Maturity adjustments can also be interpreted as additional capital required related 
to downgrades (BCBS, 2005).  
In addition, maturity structure is important in the calculation of Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR). We mentioned that the aim of this ratio is to “ensure a sustainable maturity 
structure of assets and liabilities”. However, this ratio will not be finalised before 1 January 
2018, and maturity structure will be much more relevant in the following years. Still, we 
examine our sample banks’ maturity structure and see if they have taken any actions to 
change this already, as that helps reduce their RWA. In our sample banks’ annual reports we 
find information of their maturity structures, and this analysis is based on their reported 
values. 
HSBC has divided their maturities into 
several categories but we cannot see large 
changes from 2011 to 2013. By looking at 
maturities divided into only two categories we 
see some changes from 2006 (figure 6). These 
changes could appear because financial assets 
are included under the category “due after 
more than one year”. Hence, it might be that Figure 6: The maturity of HSBC's assets 
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the proportion of financial assets or the classification of financial assets has changed, not the 
maturity in its self. In the last year’s most of their assets had a short term maturity. In 2012 
63% of their assets were due within one year.  
Barclays and Standard Chartered also have a 
high share of short-term assets; in 2012 
Barclays had 75% and Standard Chartered had 
56% of their assets due within one year. This 
allocation has been relatively stable for both 
banks, and the maturity of their assets can be 
found in appendix 11.4. 
LBG did not report their maturity structure for 
2013, and contrary to the other banks a large 
share of their assets are due after more than 
one year, 75% in 2012. For LBG there has been an increase in assets due over 5 years, but 
assets due within one year has been relatively stable, especially after 2009 as can be seen in 
figure 7. 
Findings 
Our analysis does not show any large changes, which means that the reductions in RWA are 
not due to changes in maturity structures. Possible reasons for these small changes might be 
that maturity structures have little effect on RWA, and because it takes time to change them. 
We believe that there will be changes, especially for LBG, in the future and in relation to the 
introduction of NSFR, where maturity structures, for both assets and liabilities, are essential.  
In the next sections we analyse both assets and RWA by business to see if the sample banks 
have made some changes related to their business structure. 
 Assets by business 8.4
Basel III will have different impacts on various business segments, where the main business 
segments are retail, corporate and investments banking. Retail banking will be affected least 
while investment banking will be highly affected, especially related to trading businesses. 
Within the trading business there are mainly three activities that will be affected; OTC 
derivatives, cash trading and securitisations. Securitisations have been covered in previous 
Figure 7: The maturity of LBG's assets 
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Basel rules, but in Basel III there is a technical change; Under Basel II securitisations were 
deducted 50/50 under Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Securitisation positions will now be added to 
RWA with a risk weight of 1250%, which will increase capital requirements (Harle, et al., 
2010). 
The compositions of assets by different businesses as found in the annual reports: 
 
HSBC’s largest business is global banking while investment banking is the main business for 
Barclays. For LBG commercial and retail banking are the largest businesses. Standard 
Chartered has divided their assets into only two categories with a main focus on wholesale 
banking.  
To further analyse assets by business we divided the different businesses into broader 
segments; Retail, Corporate and Other, which demonstrates that LBG is the biggest retail 
bank while the other three banks have a larger corporate focus.  
Figure 8: The composition of assets for each bank 
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Findings 
We cannot find any large changes in our sample banks’ share of assets attributable to 
different businesses; hence we cannot see that they have changed business focus to adapt to 
the new framework. However, as seen in section 5.1 the different increases in RWA due to 
the new rules are related to the type of businesses each bank is involved in. HSBC and 
Barclays have their biggest businesses within corporate and investment banking and they 
also have the highest increase in RWA.  
The retail segment will be less affected than the other segments regarding stricter risk 
weighting, which can explain the low increase from Basel II RWA to Basel III RWA for 
LBG. Standard Chartered also have a very low increase in RWA due to the new 
requirements, which could be explained by their corporate segment containing less 
investment banking than for HSBC and Barclays. Within investment banking several core 
businesses will be affected, in particular trading and securitisation businesses (Harle, et al., 
2010).  
None of the sample banks have changed their business focus noteworthy over the last years. 
This means that they have not, seemingly, changed their business focus to affect RWAs.  
 RWA by business 8.5
In addition to the analysis of assets by business we will also look at RWA by business. We 
have tried to calculate the riskiness of assets attributable to different businesses, where the 
calculations can be found in appendix 11.5. In this analysis our calculations are based on 
RWA under Basel II rules, and each bank has to some extent reported total assets and RWA 
for each business. By dividing RWA for a business by the amount of assets attributable to 
that business segment we can get a measure (ratio) of how risky the assets of each segment 
are. Risk ratio: 
                           
                              
 
Information on RWA by business was only sufficient as of 2010, and this analysis was not 
possible to conduct for previous years. Some types of businesses have higher risk weight 
than other, for example commercial banking which has a higher risk ratio than retail 
banking. 
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For HSBC there were no large changes regarding the allocation of assets to different 
businesses which can mean that they have reduced the riskiness within each business 
segment. In 2012 HSBC had 30% of their RWA allocated to commercial banking, while 
only 12% of total assets were allocated to same segment. The risk ratio to commercial 
banking was 112,7% in 2010, but reduced to 109% in 2012, as shown in table 18, and in 
appendix 11.5 for the other banks. This indicates that they have reduced the riskiness of 
commercial banking. To decrease the riskiness within different business segments, HSBC 
has sold shares in subsidiaries, for example in Ping An
5
, which reduced their credit risk.  
 
Table 18: Riskiness of assets for HSBC 
LBG has also reduced the risk ratio attributable to commercial banking from 63% in 2010 to 
53% in 2012. LBG has taken several actions to reduce the riskiness of their assets and in the 
interim report from 2013 they state to have reduced non-core assets, core lending and 
improved the credit quality of their retail assets.  
For Barclays their most risky business segment is Barclaycard where RWA constituted 
105% of the assets to this segment. In 2012 they have reduced the riskiness of this segment, 
to a ratio of 97%. Barclays has a large share of their total RWA attributable to Investment 
Bank; 46% in 2012. But when comparing to total assets allocated to this segment, these 
assets seem to have a relatively low risk; with a risk ratio of only 17%. Barclay’s 
management states in the 2012 annual report that they will have a focus on reducing RWA to 
assets, and they have reduced credit risk within corporate banking and started an exit from 
non-core international portfolios.  
Findings 
This analysis shows that the sample banks have reduced the riskiness of their assets within 
each business segment by taking on management actions to reduce non-core assets and credit 
risk. The changes are done within the different business segments, not by changing their 
business structures. 
                                                          
5 Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd 
Riskiness of assets
HSBC Assets RWA RWA/Assets Assets RWA RWA/Assets Assets RWA RWA/Assets
 - Personal Financial Services / Retail 
Banking and Wealth Management 536 244     276 600     52 % 540 548     351 200     65 % 527 698     357 000     68 %
 - Commercial Banking 363 659     397 000     109 % 334 966     382 900     114 % 296 797     334 400     112,7 %
 - Global Banking and Markets 1 942 470 403 100     21 % 1 877 627 423 000     23 % 1 758 315 353 200     20 %
 - Global Private Banking 118 440     21 700       18 % 119 839     22 500       19 % 116 846     24 900       21 %
 - Other 201 741     25 500       13 % 180 126     29 900       17 % 161 458     33 600       21 %
 - Intra-HSBC items -470 016   -             0 % -497 527   0 % -406 425   0 %
Total 2 692 538 1 123 900 42 % 2 555 579 1 209 500 47 % 2 454 689 1 103 100 45 %
2012 2011 2010
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9. How are the banks situated today? 
To get an overview of how our sample banks are situated today, we estimate required 2019 
CET1 ratio. We analyse capital shortfall to this requirement by quantifying necessary 
increase in CET1 or reduction in RWA.  We also estimate our sample banks’ future CET1 
ratios for comparison to end point requirement.  
 Estimated Requirements 9.1
As stated in the theory section 2.5 there are several requirements that affect the target CET1 
ratio. The minimum level of 4.5% of CET1 to RWA will increase with the capital buffers. 
All of the sample banks will have to meet the capital conservation buffer at 2.5%, the 
countercyclical buffer which will vary in the range of 0% - 2.5% and the systemic risk buffer 
which is not finalised by UK regulators but will be somewhere in the range of 0% - 3%. 
There will also be two additional buffers that vary between our sample banks; the G-SIB 
buffer and the Pillar 2 requirements.  
The G-SIB buffer will be mandatory for banks that are considered globally important. The 
updated list of Global Systematic Important Banks was published by the Financial Stability 
Board November 2013 giving the following implication for the sample banks:  
 HSBC is placed in bucket 4 and assigned a G-SIB Buffer of 2.5% 
 Barclays is placed in bucket 3 and assigned a G-SIB Buffer of 2.0% 
 Standard Chartered is placed in bucket 1 and assigned a G-SIB Buffer of 1.0% 
 LBG is not considered a G-SIB.  
(FSB, 2013) 
HSBC is subject to the largest G-SIB buffer, which affects the total level of required CET1. 
LBG is not on the list, but can potentially be considered a domestic important bank and 
thereby receive an additional capital requirement, but this is not covered in this calculation. 
The additional level of CET1 required by the regulators due to Pillar 2, as discussed in the 
theory chapter 2.6, is individual for each bank. Since the required CET1 for this buffer is not 
public as of today, this is noted with an “X” in figure 9 and not assigned a specific 
percentage in the calculation. This can potentially increase the requirement for some or all of 
the sample banks. 
 63 
Total requirements are presented in figure 9 with the potential maximum and minimum 
level.  
 
Figure 9: Required CET1 ratios 
 Shortfall Calculation 9.2
To analyse the shortfall, potential end-point requirements are compared to the banks CET1 
ratios as of 2012. Further, the different requirements will be divided into two groups; 
established requirements and non-established requirements. Established requirements will 
include the minimum requirement (4,5%), the capital conservation buffer (2,5%) and the 
individual G-SIB buffer, which are all finalised by UK regulators. The non-established 
requirements will include the countercyclical buffer and the systematic risk buffer, where the 
levels are not known as of November 2013. Pillar 2 requirements will be excluded from this 
calculation because we have no information about the range.  
Except for Barclays that face a shortfall of 0,5%, all of the banks have sufficient CET1 ratios 
to cover the established requirements shown in table 19. LBG and Standard Chartered have 
additional CET1 to cover other requirements, whereas HSBC barely meet their established 
requirement.  
4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 
2,50% 2,50% 2,50% 2,50% 
2,50% 
2,00% 
1,0 % 
0% - 2,50% 
0% - 2,50% 
0% - 2,50% 
0% - 2,50% 
0% - 3 % 
0% - 3% 
0% - 3 % 
0% - 3 % 
X 
X 
X 
X 
HSBC Barclays LBG Standard Chartered
Required CET1 ratio 
Pillar 2
Systemic Risk Buffer
Countercyclical Buffer
G-SIB Buffer
Conservation buffer
Minimum requirement
min 9.5% + 
X 
min 9% + X 
max 
min 7% + X 
max 
min 8% + X 
max 13,5%+X 
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  HSBC Barclays LBG Standard Chartered 
1.CET1 ratio 2012 9,5 % 8,5 % 8,1 % 10,7 % 
2.Established requirements 9,50 % 9,00 % 7,00 % 8,00 % 
3.Shortfall to established 
requirements 
0,00 % -0,50 % 1,10 % 2,70 % 
4.Maximum requirements 15,00 % 14,50 % 12,50 % 13,50 % 
5.Shortfall to maximum requirements -5,50 % -6,00 % -4,40 % -2,80 % 
Table 19: Shortfall to CET1 requirements for all banks 
The maximum requirements include both the established and the non-established 
requirements. If all of these buffers are at its maximum level for all sample banks the 
estimated shortfall would significantly increase as stated in line 5 in table 19. 
 How to meet the end-point requirement? 9.3
To quantify the shortfall based on the potential end-point, the necessary increase in the 
CET1 ratio is analysed. To increase the CET1 ratio banks could increase their CET1 capital 
and/or reduce the level of RWA. For exemplification of the potential end-point requirement 
the maximum requirement is used as a worst case scenario. 
Table 20 illustrate the necessary increase in CET1 and the reduction in RWA to meet the 
target CET1 ratio. The CET1 value is calculated by taking the level of RWA as a constant 
and assuming the increase does not affect RWA. The necessary reduction in RWA is based 
on the similar assumption of a constant CET1.  
2012 HSBC Barclays LBG Standard Chartered 
Necessary increase (%) in CET1 58 % 71 % 55 % 26 % 
Necessary reduction (%) in RWA 37 % 41 % 36 % 21 % 
Table 20: Necessary changes in CET1 and RWA to meet maximum CET1 ratio. 
The minimum necessary increase in CET1 and reduction in RWA gives an indication of the 
magnitude of actions that the sample banks have to undertake to fulfil the target ratio. As 
discussed earlier the CET1 can be increased by e.g. retaining earnings, issue shares or 
decreasing the items that have to be deducted from CET1. RWA can be reduced in two 
ways; either by reducing total assets and maintain the average riskiness of these, or adjusting 
the average risk weight of the asset portfolio. These options can also be combined, and in the 
next section we look at necessary growth in CET1 ratios. 
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CET1 ratios in 2019 
We estimate our sample banks’ CET1 ratios based on previous growth and compare to the 
maximum 2019 requirement. Average growth in CET1 ratios necessary to achieve the 2019 
requirement
6
 are shown in table 21 column 2. We also estimate future CET1 ratios based on 
average growth as of 2011 and 2012, shown in table 21 column 3. Basel III was introduced 
in 2010; hence we use the average growth after this as an estimate for future growth.  
CET1 ratio Average growth necessary to reach 
maximum CET1 ratio 
Average growth 2011 and 
2012 
HSBC 7,9 % 11,8 % 
Barclays 9,3 % 6,3 % 
LBG 7,5 % 9,8 % 
Standard Chartered 4,0 % -0,5 % 
Table 21: CET1 ratio: Average growth necessary and average growth 2011 and 2012 
Barclays and Standard Chartered face a shortfall if they do not increase the growth rate of 
their CET1 ratio. On the other hand, HSBC and LBG had a large increase over the last two 
years, and will meet the requirement by a comfortable margin if they maintain same growth 
rate. The estimated CET1 ratios for 2019 compared to the maximum requirements for each 
bank are shown in figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: CET1 ratios 2019 compared to maximum requirement. 
                                                          
6 Achieved 1 January 2019.  
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 Findings 9.4
The CET1 ratios have increased over the last years but all our sample banks fall short of the 
maximum end-point requirement (with CET1 ratios as of today). Although all sample banks 
are under UK regulation, they face different requirements reflecting global importance. The 
calculations show that Standard Chartered is relatively well prepared for the requirements, 
whereas the other three banks have a larger shortfall which indicates that they have to 
undertake several actions in the forthcoming years. It is therefore expected that they will 
continue to retain earnings, issue new shares and/or take actions to reduce the riskiness of 
their assets because they may be imposed restrictions on capital distributions if they do not 
reach an adequate CET1 ratio. HSBC and LBG will reach the maximum 2019 requirement if 
they maintain same growth in CET1 as of 2011 and 2012. For Barclays and Standard 
Chartered, growth in CET1 ratios has to increase towards 2019 to reach the maximum 
requirement.  
 Weaknesses  9.5
Finalisation of the target requirements is still on-going which leads to uncertainty in the 
estimated shortfall. The countercyclical buffer depends on the buffer that applies in the 
jurisdictions banks have exposure to. Regarding the systemic risk buffer, information is not 
available. In addition, the Pillar 2 requirements are not included in our calculation because 
the accurate level is not available, and the list of Domestic Systemically Important Banks 
(D-SIB) is not published by UK regulators. The requirement of LBG is most likely 
underestimated compared the other banks, as their lower level of mandatory requirement 
may lead to a higher Pillar 2 requirement. 
This thesis covers the CET1 requirements and thereby excludes calculations of the additional 
Tier 1 and total capital. Additional requirements to the Tier 1 capital and the total capital 
may also increase the total capital shortfall the banks face.  
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10. Conclusion 
We will now discuss main findings which can contribute to answer our research question; 
“How have banks adjusted to increase CET1 ratios?” Primarily we wanted to examine if the 
adjustments were made in numerator or denominator. 
 Main findings 10.1
We started our thesis by estimating CET1 and RWA assuming fully implemented CRD IV 
for the years 2000, 2006 and 2009-2012, and find that all banks have increased CET1 ratios.  
Analysis shows that our sample banks have adjusted both numerator and denominator in the 
CET1 ratio, but the main driver has been a reduction of denominator, RWA. CET1 has 
increased due to improved quality of equity, but to a large extent none of the banks have 
managed this by obtaining new capital from shareholders. Except for LBG, which has had 
negative profits over the last years, the sample banks have increased retained earnings. 
Especially HSBC and Barclays have managed this by reducing payout ratios. Increasing 
equity through retained earnings has improved the quality of equity.  
When calculating RWA we find that Basel III has different impacts on our sample banks. 
The implementation of Basel III increase all sample banks’ RWA, especially due to 
counterparty credit risk (CCR) and securitisation positions. HSBC and Barclays face the 
largest increases due to their business structure; they are both large investment banks and 
have high international exposure. 
The reduction in RWA is analysed by looking into the balance sheet structure of assets, 
exposure to GIIPS, maturity of assets, assets by business and riskiness of assets. 
Through the analysis of the balance sheet we cannot find any indications of how they have 
adjusted their assets to reduce RWA. Regarding the exposure to GIIPS we find a downward 
trend and because such exposures have a high risk weight, reducing these will decrease 
RWA. Still, these exposures are relatively small for our sample banks; hence they cannot 
explain much of the reduction. Further, we find no significant changes in maturity structure 
of assets or in the allocation of assets to business. However, when we look at average risk in 
each business segment we find a reduction of riskiness. This analysis shows that our sample 
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banks have reduced RWA through changes within each business segment, not by changing 
their business structures. 
Shortly; Increases in CET1 ratios are mainly due to reduced riskiness of asset portfolios, 
which has reduced RWA. 
We also calculate required CET1 ratios each sample bank will face in 2019, and they all face 
a capital shortfall as of today. This means that there are still management actions that have to 
take place in the next few years in order to further increase CET1 ratios. By assuming same 
average growth in CET1 ratios as of 2011-2012 for future years, we find that Barclays and 
Standard Chartered will not meet their final requirements in 2019.  
 Delimitations 10.2
Values for our calculations are based on banks’ annual reports and Pillar 3 documents, which 
sometimes have been insufficient. To a large extent the reporting consists of aggregate sizes, 
which makes it difficult to extract the correct values needed for our calculations. In addition, 
banks use IRB-methods to calculate risk weighted assets, which is not available. Values 
from 2012 and 2013 are based on our sample banks interpretation of a preliminary 
framework, and may therefore be incorrect. We have tried to implement Basel III to our 
sample banks by best effort, but misinterpretations could have occurred because of the 
complexity. 
 Further research 10.3
This thesis is limited to a sample of four banks, and one subject of interest could be to 
undertake a closer analysis of the changes in CET1 and RWA due to Basel III on a larger 
sample. By looking at a larger sample it can be possible to analyse the various effects Basel 
III will have on the different business structures.  
Another interesting topic would be to look at their lending portfolio. We found that the 
sample banks have changed their composition of assets within different asset categories. 
However, it could be interesting to look at banks’ lending policies and if the implementation 
of Basel III will affect different types of costumers. 
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In this thesis we have only analysed UK banks, which overall show better CET1 ratios than 
the “average bank” from the EBA monitoring exercise. The economic situation within the 
EU differs and especially the southern European banks struggle. It could be interesting to 
analyse how these banks are situated today regarding the new framework, and if they will be 
able to implement Basel III within the established timeline. One could also take an even 
broader perspective and undertake a comparison between US banks and European banks. US 
banks have an extended phase-in arrangement, and are not under the same regulations as the 
European banks. These differences might affect the competitiveness of the banks.  
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11. Appendix 
 Abbreviations  11.1
AVC    Asset Value Correlation  
BCBS   Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BIS    Bank for International Settlements 
CCB    Countercyclical Buffer 
CCR    Counterparty Credit Risk 
CET1   Common Equity Tier 1 capital 
CET1 ratio  CET1/RWA  
CRD IV EU Capital Requirement Directive for Basel III  
CRR  Capital Requirement Regulation 
CVA    Credit Value Adjustments 
DTA  Deferred Tax Assets 
DVA  Debit Valuation Adjustments 
D-SIB   Domestic Systemically Important Bank 
EBA  European Banking Authority 
G-SIB   Global Systemically Important Bank 
GIIPS  Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
IRB  Internal Rate Based (method used by banks to calculate RWA) 
LBG  Lloyds Banking Group Plc. 
LCR  Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
OTC  Over The Counter (derivatives) 
NSFR  Net Stable Funding Ratio 
PRA  Prudential Regulation Authority 
PVA  Prudent Valuation Adjustments 
RWA    Risk Weighted Assets 
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Common equity tier 1 £m REF: 2012 2011 2010 2009 2006 2000
Called up share capital 1 7 042         6 881         6 815         10 472       1 429         1 396         
Share premium 2 16 872       16 541       16 291       14 472       1 266         595            
Retained earnings 3 7 183         8 680         11 380       11 117       8 105         7 403         
Accumulated other comprehensive income 4 12 902       13 818       11 575       7 217         355             -             
Minority interest (amount allowed in 
consolidated CET 1 ) 5 -             -             -             -             -             -             
CET 1 before regulatory adjustments 43 999       45 920       46 061       43 278       11 155       9 394         
Regulatory adjustments
Goodwill and intangible assets 6 -4 107       -4 326       -4 406       -5 779       -2 515        -2 599       
Fair value reserves related to gains or losses on 
cash flow hedges 7 -350           -325           391            305            -12             
Negative amounts resulting from from the 
calculation of exp. loss amounts 8 -1 272       -1 440       -             -             
Defined benefit pension fund assets 9 -1 748       -1 131       -479           -             -             -             
Direct and indirect holdings by an institution of 
own CET 1 instruments 10 -             -             -             -             -28             
Reciprocal cross holdings (material holdings) 11 -5 066       -5 899       -6 034       -5 267       
Deferred tax assets that rely on future 
profitability excluding temporary differences 12 -5 107       -5 862       -6 572       -5 925       -326           -             
Gains or losses on liabilities at fair value 
resulting from own credit 13 217            -136           -8               -             
Additional value adjustments 14 -376           -392           -394           -370           -95             -80             
Total regulatory adjustments -17 809     -19 512     -17 501     -17 036     -2 948        -2 707       
Common Equity Tier 1 26 190       26 408       28 560       26 242       8 207         6 687         
Common equity tier 1 £m REF: 2012 2011 2010 2009 2006 2000
Called up share capital 1 3 061         3 050         3 045         2 853         1 634         1 662         
Share premium 2 9 416         9 330         9 294         7 951         5 818         4 950         
Retained earnings 3 37 465       39 372       36 765       33 845       12 169       5 844         
Accumulated other comprehensive income 4 3 644         3 837         1 754         2 628         390             731            
Minority interest (amount allowed in 
consolidated CET 1 ) 5 1 541         1 729         1 817         1 264         2 990         108            
CET 1 before regulatory adjustments 55 127       57 318       52 675       48 541       23 001       13 295       
Regulatory adjustments
Goodwill and intangible assets 6 -7 622       -7 560       -8 326       -8 345       -7 307        -4 269       
Fair value reserves related to gains or losses on 
cash flow hedges 7 -2 099       -1 442       -152           -252           230             
Negative amounts resulting from from the 
calculation of exp. loss amounts 8 -1 648       -1 270       -336           -50             
Defined benefit pension fund assets 9 -2 050       -1 482       -             -             -             -             
Direct and indirect holdings by an institution of 
own CET 1 instruments 10 -187           -173           -135           -147           -212           -5               
Reciprocal cross holdings (material holdings) 11 -             -794           -1 337       -1 901       -454           -             
Deferred tax assets that rely on future 
profitability excluding temporary differences 12 -1 346       -1 493       -1 558       -1 038       -1                -             
Gains or losses on liabilities at fair value 
resulting from own credit 13 804            -2 680       -621           -340           -             -             
Additional value adjustments 14 -1 458       -1 516       -1 393       -1 284       -608           -352           
Total regulatory adjustments -15 606     -18 410     -13 858     -13 357     -8 352        -4 626       
Common Equity Tier 1 39 521       38 908       38 817       35 184       14 649       8 669         
 Calculation of CET1 11.2
Barclays  
LBG 
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Standard Chartered 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Common equity tier 1 US$m REF: 2012 2011 2010 2009 2006 2000
Called up share capital 1 1 207         1 193         1 174         1 013         692             861            
Share premium 2 3 981         3 938         3 892         3 334         3 539         2 761         
Retained earnings 3 26 561       23 167       19 260       15 460       8 316         3 850         
Accumulated other comprehensive income 4 12 118       10 922       12 392       6 039         4 306         66               
Minority interest (amount allowed in 
consolidated CET 1 ) 5 104            84               79               31               -             -             
CET 1 before regulatory adjustments 43 971       39 304       36 797       25 877       16 853       7 538         
Regulatory adjustments
Goodwill and intangible assets 6 -7 312       -7 061       -6 980       -6 620       -6 146        -2 269       
Fair value reserves related to gains or losses on 
cash flow hedges 7 -81             13               -57             -15             -51             -             
Negative amounts resulting from from the 
calculation of exp. loss amounts 8 -1 932       -1 404       -1 328       -1 004       -442           
Defined benefit pension fund assets 9 -             -             -             -             -             -             
Direct and indirect holdings by an institution of 
own CET 1 instruments 10 -             -             -             -             -             -             
Reciprocal cross holdings (material holdings) 11 -             -             -             -             -             -             
Deferred tax assets that rely on future 
profitability excluding temporary differences 12 -477           -433           -324           -277           -68             -137           
Gains or losses on liabilities at fair value 
resulting from own credit 13 -             -             -             -             -             -             
Additional value adjustments 14 -210           -188           -176           -124           -80             -36             
Total regulatory adjustments -10 012     -9 073       -8 865       -8 040       -6 787        -2 442       
Common Equity Tier 1 33 959       30 232       27 932       17 837       10 066       5 096         
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 Calculation of RWA 11.3
This section shows the detailed calculation of RWA and the assumption that have been 
made. There are differences regarding the details in the reported changes for the banks, 
which affect the calculation and problems regarding this is discussed for the banks. The 
calculation of the threshold effects includes both DTA and unconsolidated investments, and 
the two effects are specified for each bank.  
HSBC 
Calculation of RWA 
HSBC has a detailed explanation about the increase in RWA due to Basel III and the 
previous numbers are calculated based on this as our own calculations of effect 1 and 2 show 
similar numbers as the ones reported. For the effect 3-5 the percentage increase of 2012 is 
used as a best estimate.  
 
Threshold calculations (2) 
The amount of unconsolidated investments that is not deducted in Basel III calculations of 
CET1 is risk weighted with 250% The amount of DTA is found by taking the balance value 
and adjusting it for the deduction for tax losses carried forward as shown in the table below. 
HSBC 2013 % HSBC 2012 % 2011 2010 2009 2006 2000
Reported Basel II 1 104 764  1 123 943  1 209 514 1 103 113 1 133 168 938 678 383 687
Definition of capital calculated
1. 50/50 43 843        4,0 % 44 906        4,0 % 30 175,00 2 % 36 675,00 3 % 39 475,00 3 %
2. Threshold 36 775        3,3 % 45 940        4,1 % 39 343       3 % 40 140       4 % 41 640       4 % 19 884      1 818        
3. Other; moved to deduction DTA -8 187        -0,7 % -8 976        -0,8 % -9 659        -1 % -8 810        -1 % -9 050        -1 %
4. CVA 38 339        3,5 % 60 360        5,4 % 64 955       5 % 59 241       5 % 60 855       5 %
5. AVC 25 769        2,3 % 25 682        2,3 % 27 637       2 % 25 206       2 % 25 893       2 %
Basel III 1 241 303  12,4 % 1 291 855  14,9 % 1 361 965 13 % 1 255 565 14 % 1 291 982 14 % 1070234 437460,9
HSBC 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2006 2000
Total unconsolidated investments 13344 18757 14901 14848 11994 7512 1463
Deductions related to sign inv under Basel III 6 042         9 436         7 496         7 470         6 034         3 779         736         
Percentage of total unc. inv deducted 45 % 50 %
Amount asigned a risk-weight of 250% 7302 9 321         7 405         7 378         5 960         3 733         727         
DTA temporary diff below threshold 6816 6 953         6 398         663             8 213         3 241         -          
Risk-weighted value below threshold 18255 23 303       18 512       18 446       14 901       9 332         1 818      
DTA temporary diff below threshold 18 520       22 638       20 831       21 693       26 740       10 552       0
% unconsolidated 50 % 51 % 47 % 46 % 36 % 47 % 100 %
%DTA 50 % 49 % 53 % 54 % 64 % 53 % 0 %
Total Threshold 36 775       45 940       39 343       40 140       41 640       19 884       1 818      
Deferred Tax assets 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2006 2000
Balance value DTA 7 205 7 570 7 726 7 011 8 620 3 241
Deducted -389 -617           -1 328        -348           -407           -             -          
After deductions of tax losses carried forward 6 816 6 953 6 398 6 663 8 213 3 241 0
92 % 104 % 123 % 39 %
RW value 18 520       22 638       20 831       21 693       26 740       10 552       
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Barclays 
Calculation of RWA 
Barclays have given detailed information about their change, and we find the similar 
amounts of securitisation positions and the threshold in our calculation. The other effect is 
also here based on the level in 2012. 
 
Threshold calculation (2) 
Unconsolidated investments are adjusted for the deduction made in CET1. DTA that relates 
to temporary differences does not exceed the threshold and the amount is risk weighted. 
 
LBG 
Calculation of RWA 
LBG have not specified what the increase in RWA results from. We have therefore used 
estimates on the subjects we have knowledge about and tried to give an estimate on the 
residual post related to the difference. The reported number for RWA in 2012 and 2013 does 
not include the securitisation charge, as LBG has chosen to apply this by deduction. In this 
thesis we have chosen to follow the Basel III/CRD IV requirements and use the risk 
weighting alternative. Therefore the reported numbers in 2012 and 2013 will differ from our 
calculations as stated in the analysis.  
 
Barclays 2013 % 2012 % 2011 % 2010 % 2009 % 2006 2000
Risk-weighted Basel II reported 387 230       386 858   390 999   398 031   382 653    297 833   147 040   
50/50: Securitisation positions 19 000          4,9 % 30 150      7,8 % 39 425      10,1 % 59 000      14,8 % 69 975       18,3 %
Threshold 10 975          2,8 % 5 380        1,4 % 13 718      3,5 % 12 436      3,1 % 12 434       3,2 % -            
Other: counterparty credit risk, 
reductions due to deductions and other 54 325          14,0 % 45 612      11,8 % 46 100      11,8 % 46 929      11,8 % 45 116       11,8 %
Basel III calculated 471 530       21,8 % 468 000   21,0 % 490 242   25,4 % 516 396   29,7 % 510 178    33,3 % 397 091   196 043   
Barclays 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
Total unconsolidated investments 950 482 4764 5352 5610
Deductions related to sign inv under Basel III 0 0 793,8 1336,6 1901,4
Amount asigned a risk-weight of 250% 950 482           3 970        4 015        3 709        
Risk-weighted value unconsolidatet inv. 2375 1 205        9 926        10 039      9 272        
DTA temporary diff below threshold 3 440        1 670        1 517        959           1 265        
Risk Weighted value DTA temporary diff. 8 600        4 175        3 793        2 398        3 163        
Total RWA increase 10 975      5 380        13 718      12 436      12 434      
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Threshold (2) 
Lloyds have reported material holdings (deducted 50% CT1 and Tier1) and unconsolidated 
investment separate (Tier 2). The total number includes some instruments which qualify for 
a deduction in Tier 2. To reflect this we use the percentage number deducted in CT1 and Tier 
2 and use the residual amount as the risk weighted value. For DTA almost the entire amount 
relates to tax losses carried forward and deducted in CET1. The residual amount is 
insignificant and not included. 
 
Standard Chartered 
Calculation of RWA 
For Standard Chartered the details about the difference are only found in 2013, where it's 
specified the amount of deferred tax assets and significant investments. For the other effects, 
we only have the residual amount as a measure.  
 
Lloyds £m 2013 % 2012 % 2011 % 2010 % 2009 % 2006 2000
Risk-weighted Basel II reported 288 730       310 299       352 341       406 372       493 307       156 043   94 000      
50/50: Securitisation positions 1 400            0,5 % 4 575            1,5 % 3 825            1,1 % 5 350            1,3 % 11 125          2,3 %
Threshold 7 585            2,6 % 7 880            2,5 % 9 176            2,6 % 9 385            2,3 % 8 192            1,7 %
Other: Counterparty credit risk, 
reduction due to deductions and other 3 291            1,1 % 2 918            0,9 % 3 313            0,9 % 3 821            0,9 % 4 639            0,9 %
Basel III calculated 301 006       4,3 % 325 672       5,0 % 368 656       4,6 % 424 929       4,6 % 517 263       4,9 % 163 621   98 565      
Basel III reported (note) 299 606       321 097       3,5 %
Diff relates to 50/50 treatment of bank 1 400            4 575            
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
100% of material holdings from tier 1 and tier 2 8 546            92                  188               138               
Unc. investements (Tier 2 Basel II) 11 033          12 767          13 112          11 566          
Total unconsolidated investments 8 546            11 125          12 955          13 250          11 566          
Deductions under Basel III in CET1 3 820            5 066            5 899            6 034            5 267            
% of total unc- investments deducted 45 % 45,5 %
Deducted in Tier 1/total cap 1 692            2 907            3 385            3 462            3 022            
% deducted in total cap 20 % 26 %
Amount to RWA 3 034            3 152            3 670            3 754            3 277            
Charge in RWA 7 585            7 880            9 176            9 385            8 192            
Standard Chartered 2013 % 2012 % 2011 % 2010 % 2009 % 2006 2000
Risk-weighted Basel II reported 323 776       301 861   270 510   245 077   213 923    153 443   69 342      
50/50: Securitisation positions 2775 0,9 % 2950 1,0 % 2650 1,0 % 3300 1,3 % 2425 1,1 %
Threshold 3 622            1,1 % 3 295        1,1 % 3 610        1,3 % 3 185        1,3 % 4 408         2,1 %
Other: counterparty credit risk, 
reductions due to deductions and other 3 008            0,9 % 10 283      3,4 % 9 215        3,4 % 8 349        3,4 % 7 287         3,4 %
Basel III calculated 333 181       2,9 % 318 389   5,5 % 285 985   5,7 % 259 911   6,1 % 228 043    6,6 % 163 571   73 919      
Basel III reported by bank 330 406       315 439   4,5 %
Diff. relating to 50/50 treatment of bank 2 775            2 950        
 76 
Threshold 
For unconsolidated investments the total amount is risk weighted with 250% since it does 
not exceed the threshold of CET1. DTA is estimated based on the reported capital charge in 
2013 and the level of balance value and deduction the earlier year.  
 
 
 
 Maturity of assets 11.4
 
Standard Chartered 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2006 2000
Total unconsolidated investments 1004 1104 1042 652 474 229           22              
Deductions related to sign inv under Basel III 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amount asigned a risk-weight of 250% 1004 1 104        1 042        652           474           229           22              
Risk-weighted value unconsolidatet inv. 2510 2 760        2 605        1 630        1 185        573           55              
DTA temporary diff below threshold 444,8 214           402           622           1 289        538           -            
Risk Weighted value DTA temporary diff. 1 112        535           1 005        1 555        3 223        1 345        -            
Total RWA increase 3 622        3 295        3 610        3 185        4 408        1 918        55              
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 The riskiness of assets 11.5
 
 
  
Riskiness of assets
HSBC Assets RWA RWA/Assets Assets RWA RWA/Assets Assets RWA RWA/Assets
 - Personal Financial Services / Retail 
Banking and Wealth Management 536 244     276 600     52 % 540 548     351 200     65 % 527 698     357 000     68 %
 - Commercial Banking 363 659     397 000     109 % 334 966     382 900     114 % 296 797     334 400     112,7 %
 - Global Banking and Markets 1 942 470 403 100     21 % 1 877 627 423 000     23 % 1 758 315 353 200     20 %
 - Global Private Banking 118 440     21 700       18 % 119 839     22 500       19 % 116 846     24 900       21 %
 - Other 201 741     25 500       13 % 180 126     29 900       17 % 161 458     33 600       21 %
 - Intra-HSBC items -470 016   -             0 % -497 527   0 % -406 425   0 %
Total 2 692 538 1 123 900 42 % 2 555 579 1 209 500 47 % 2 454 689 1 103 100 45 %
Barclays Assets RWA RWA/Assets Assets RWA RWA/Assets Assets RWA RWA/Assets
UK Retail Banking (UKRBB) 136 665     38 783       28 % 127 845     33 956       27 % 121 590     35 274       29 %
Western Europe Retail Banking (Europe RBB) 47 128       17 112       36 % 51 310       17 436       34 % 53 609       17 269       32 %
Barclays Africa (Africa RBB) 44 798       27 008       60 % 48 243       30 289       63 % 57 760       38 401       66 %
Barclaycard 37 511       36 464       97 % 33 838       34 186       101 % 30 324       31 913       105 %
Investment Bank (Barclays Capital) 1 074 805 178 019     17 % 1 158 350 186 700     16 % 1 094 799 191 275     17 %
Barclays Corporate (Corporate Banking) 86 255       67 973       79 % 91 190       72 842       80 % 88 239       70 796       80 %
Wealth and Investment Management 23 716       15 833       67 % 20 866       13 076       63 % 17 849       12 472       70 %
Head Office Functions and Other Operations 39 443       5 666         14 % 31 885       2 514         8 % 25 475       631             2 %
Total 1 490 321 386 858     26 % 1 563 527 390 999     25 % 1 489 645 398 031     27 %
LBG Assets RWA RWA/Assets Assets RWA RWA/Assets Assets RWA RWA/Assets
Retail 346 030     95 470       28 % 356 295     103 237     29 % 370 708     109 254     29 %
Commercial Banking 314 090     165 209     53 % 350 711     189 200     54 % 355 582     222 716     63 %
Wealth, Asset Finance and International 76 449       36 167       47 % 73 345       47 278       64 % 85 158       58 714       69 %
Insurance 143 851     13 453       9 % 140 754     12 626       9 % 144 540     15 688       11 %
Other 44 132       -             0 % 49 441       0 % 35 586       0 %
Total 924 552     310 299     34 % 970 546     352 341     36 % 991 574     406 372     41 %
Standard Chartered Assets RWA RWA/Assets Assets RWA RWA/Assets Assets RWA RWA/Assets
Consumer Banking 143 250     80 889       56 % 135 154     71 970       53 % 125 589     67 551       54 %
Wholesale banking 491 409     220 972     45 % 455 562     198 540     44 % 389 197     177 526     46 %
Other 1 859         0 % 1 970         0 % 1 756         0 %
Total 636 518     301 861     47 % 592 686     270 510     46 % 516 542     245 077     47 %
2012 2011 2010
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